# Translators Case

## Afghanistan Advantage

### 1NC – Machine Translation Solves

#### Machine translating for the military is successful

Marion Marking 16, Communications specialist, veteran journalist, and online editor at Slator, “US Military Equips Soldiers in the Field With Machine Translation”, https://slator.com/technology/us-military-equips-soldiers-field-machine-translation/

The US Army will soon reach full deployment of its so-called MFLTS project. MFLTS stands for Machine Foreign Language Translation System and is “the overarching Army Program with Department of Defense interest” to provide soldiers with machine translations via speech and text, explained MFLTS Product Director Michael Beaulieu in a presentation back in 2012. An unclassified document Slator saw showed the projected total spend on MFLTS Research, Development, Test & Evaluation from 2013-16 amounted to USD 12.5m as of 2014. The program primarily comprises machine translation, automatic speech recognition, and optical character recognition. If one were to speculate just going by the screen grabs from Beaulieu’s presentation (shown below), the MFLTS works with, at least, two possible vendors; US defense contractor Raytheon for speech-to-speech and SDL for text-to-text. Beaulieu once called language and linguistic capabilities one of the seven key cornerstones for success in the US counterinsurgency strategy. And the MFLTS drives those capabilities by rolling out machine translation tools via portable devices like laptops and smartphones. “Unfortunately there aren’t enough linguists to go around and not all of them can put on a rucksack and go up and down mountains in Afghanistan and follow troops around,” MFLTS Product Director Beaulieu pointed out, explaining that apps deployed under MFLTS filled a linguistic capability gap, which was “pretty important stuff.”

### 2NC – Machine Translation Solves

#### Machine translation works

Alex Gallafent 11, New York City-based correspondent whose reports for PRI’s The World have taken him to Swaziland, South Africa, the Brazilian Amazon, Turkey, Chile and the UAE. A former staff reporter and producer, he produced The World’s series on US presidential influence overseas in 2012. Alex’s radio career began with the BBC in London, where he produced flagship arts programs Front Row and Night Waves; Outlook; and the globe-spanning music show, Late Junction, “Machine translation for the military”, https://www.pri.org/stories/2011-04-26/machine-translation-military

The US military has been producing specialist interpreters for decades – people who spend years learning Arabic, Chinese and other challenging languages. They're the kind of people Rye Barcott depended on. He's a former Marine captain who served in Iraq. For Barcott, there's no substitute for having a flesh-and-blood interpreter by your side when you're gathering intelligence, specifically, a trusted linguist who can translate all aspects of a conversation – the verbal and the non-verbal. But as Barcott points out, few units, especially in the infantry, have access to human interpreters. Machine translation could help, with basic information at least. "When a Marine or Army unit's out patrolling and they need to ask a person for permission to enter their property for example, it's far better to have a machine than to not have anything," Barcott said. In recent years, the US military has adopted a policy of trying to give everyone who deploys some knowledge, something to hang their hat on. "Hello. And thank you for your interest in learning more about V Communicator Mobile – the first deployed and fielded mobile military application." This is one of a growing range of products out there designed to bridge the military language gap. Ernie Bright is the product manager for V Communicator Mobile, which runs on a modified iPod Touch. Bright said the focus was on assisting soldiers, not distracting them. "We knew that they were needing a more mobile easy-to-use product that would allow them to learn key tactical phrases, and also be able to just pick it up and use it," Bright said. It's impressive, quickly translating a phrase such as 'do you have any weapons?' into the equivalent language in, say, Pashto. But it's not the only translation device out there vying for a potentially lucrative military contract. Another mobile app is called SpeechTrans. According to the company's co-founder, Yan Auerbach, "It allows you to speak into the device in your native language; it will translate and speak aloud the translation instantly." Dialects It's equally impressive. SpeechTrans draws on an archive of voice samples, but it doesn't yet cover every language or – crucially with languages such as Arabic – every dialect. Yan Auerbach tells me his company is now in the running for a Pentagon project called BOLT (Boundless Operational Language Translation). The goal for BOLT is lofty: technology that would recognize not just dialects but localized slang too. That still leaves a lot of missing information: gestures and body language. It's something Ernie Bright and the V Communicator Mobile team have been thinking about. On their device, attention is paid to non-verbal communication too. For every piece of language you get an animated video, demonstrating the appropriate gesture. It's meant to help soldiers learn the language too. "They can remember that this phrase coincides with this gesture or this body language," said Bright. Interpreting gestures That's fine for stock phrases at checkpoints and the like. But soldiers have to interpret gestures as much as they have to reproduce them. And they have to do it in the blink of an eye. Could a machine ever do that work too? When it comes to translation technology, no-one yet knows where the lines will be drawn. All languages – all communications – are built on ever-shifting sands of meaning. That meaning can't ever be fully, totally captured by technology. But as translation tech accelerates it might fool us into believing otherwise. And so for the military the dream of a universal translating machine will be ever-more tantalizing.

### 1NC – Translators Fail

#### Translators fail

Ron Synovitz 8, senior correspondent for RFE/RL, “Mistakes By Afghan Translators Endanger Lives, Hamper Antiterrorism Effort”, https://www.rferl.org/a/Mistakes\_By\_Translators\_Hamper\_Afghan\_Antiterrorism\_Campaign/1195783.html

When U.S. or NATO soldiers need to communicate with Afghan villagers, they rely on translators provided by private contractors. But for various reasons -- regional dialects, cultural misunderstandings, or even ethnic animosities -- translators in Afghanistan often don't relate everything they hear. And what is lost in translation can hurt efforts by NATO and the U.S.-led coalition to win the hearts and minds of the Afghan people. In the worst cases, innocent civilians can be arrested or wrongly targeted as Taliban fighters. Zalmai Zurmutai, a Pashto translator for NATO troops in Afghanistan, is angry about what he has seen happen when unqualified translators serve as a liaison between foreign troops and Afghan villagers. For example, Zurmutai says, when a Dari speaker from northern Afghanistan is sent out with NATO troops to Pashtun parts of southern Afghanistan, it is not unusual for the translator to have difficulties understanding the local Pashto dialect. Other times, Zurmutai says, a young Afghan translator who has grown up in Europe or the United States does not understand the traditional tribal culture of Pashtun villagers. 'Unable To Convey The Meaning' Local animosities also can come into play. When a translator is from a tribe or ethnic group that suffered under the rule of the Pashtun-dominated Taliban regime, Zurmutai says some treat Pashtun village elders with contempt -- the kind of behavior that can turn an entire village against the foreign troops. "If you go to [the provinces of] Kandahar or Oruzgun or Zabol or Paktia, most people can't understand Dari," Zurmutai says. "And if you go to Badakhshan or Takhar, they don't speak Pashto and they can't understand it. Imagine when a [native Dari speaker] becomes a translator and goes into a Pashtun village where the people cannot speak Dari -- and the translator cannot understand [their local dialect of] Pashto. "Unfortunately, there are so many translators like this who are unable to convey the meaning of Pashto speakers to the coalition forces. And he can't convoy the message of foreign troops to these local people," Zurmutai continues. "There also are some Afghan translators who are coming from other countries who are less familiar with the Afghan culture. They don't know about the tribal value system. Or there are some emotional young Afghans who don't care about the local values. They have very rude behavior -- very [undiplomatic and] cruel -- without respect for people. They are creating misunderstandings between local people and the coalition forces. They are destroying mutual trust. There are some translators who are working for their own political, personal and tribal interests. These translators are treating people in a very bad way." John McHugh is an independent filmmaker whose documentary "Lost In Translation -- Afghanistan" was released on the Internet this summer by The Guardian newspaper group. Filmed while McHugh was embedded with U.S. troops near the Afghan-Pakistan border, the eight-minute documentary shows how tensions rise between U.S. soldiers and Pashtun villagers when a Dari-speaking translator is unable to understand a village elder's Waziri dialect. 'Is It Any Wonder?' The elder gives lengthy answers to the U.S. soldiers' questions about the lack of security in their village and the threats against them by Taliban fighters who regularly cross the nearby border with Pakistan. The translator fails to convey the elder's concerns. "The soldiers ask to speak to the village elders, but everything gets lost in translation," McHugh says. "Everything here hinges on the translation -- the subtleties of Pashto and English. The translators have become unexpected power brokers in all this. And sometimes, they just don't translate everything they hear. Is it any wonder that the Americans feel baffled in these situations and that ordinary Afghans feel ignored?" Zurmutai says there are many misunderstandings during NATO military operations in Afghanistan that are caused by bad translations. Zurmutai described one case in which a translator wrongly told NATO troops that an encampment of Pashtun nomads -- a Kochi tribe -- were Taliban fighters. He says it was only the last-minute intervention of another translator that stopped NATO from calling in an air strike on the tents of the innocent nomads. "Unfortunately, we can't deny that there are tribal and regional differences between Afghans today. And translators are involved in this stuff," Zurmutai says. "Many translators have been sacked because of creating these kinds of conflicts. Recently, so many people have been killed in mistaken bombardments that were later found to be the result of bad translations. "Nowadays, coalition forces understand that the real source of the problem is with the translators. And they are paying more attention to this issue," he continues. "If this problem would be solved, it would be a major step forward for reconstruction and for bringing peace and stability to Afghanistan." Security Criteria U.S. and NATO military officials in Afghanistan have admitted to RFE/RL privately that inaccurate translations cause problems for their soldiers, whether in a battle situation or simply communicating with members of a rural Afghan community. One problem has been for the U.S. military to get qualified Dari and Pashto translators who also meet the Pentagon's security criteria. For years, the Pentagon required that its translators be American citizens and also have top secret military security clearance.

### 2NC – Translators Fail

#### Translators in Afghanistan flunk language tests

ALIYAH SHAHID 10, DAILY NEWS STAFF WRITER, “One quarter of U.S. interpreters in Afghanistan flunked language exams: whistleblower lawsuit”, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/quarter-u-s-interpreters-afghanistan-flunked-language-exams-whistleblower-lawsuit-article-1.440639

A lot probably gets lost in translation. More than one of every four translators embedded with U.S. troops in Afghanistan flunked their language proficiency exams, a whistleblower told ABC News. Paul Funk, who worked for the contractor that supplied translators for the military, said 28% of applicants hired between November 2007 and June 2008 failed exams for the most common Afghan languages, Pashto and Dari.

#### Translators in Afghanistan fail – failed proficiency tests

MATTHEW MOSK et al 10, BRIAN ROSS, and JOSEPH RHEE, ABC reporters “Exclusive: Whistleblower Claims Many U.S. Interpreters Can't Speak Afghan Languages”, https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/afghanistan-whistleblower-claims-us-interpreters-speak-afghan-languages/story?id=11578169

More than one quarter of the translators working alongside American soldiers in Afghanistan failed language proficiency exams but were sent onto the battlefield anyway, according to a former employee of the company that holds contracts worth up to $1.4 billion to supply interpreters to the U.S. Army. "I determined that someone -- and I didn't know [who] at that time -- was changing the grades from blanks or zeros to passing grades," said Paul Funk, who used to oversee the screening of Afghan linguists for the Columbus, Ohio-based contractor, Mission Essential Personnel. "Many who failed were marked as being passed."

#### Translators in Afghanistan fail – corruption, fraud, and lack of expertise

MATTHEW MOSK et al 10, BRIAN ROSS, and JOSEPH RHEE, ABC reporters “Exclusive: Whistleblower Claims Many U.S. Interpreters Can't Speak Afghan Languages”, https://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/afghanistan-whistleblower-claims-us-interpreters-speak-afghan-languages/story?id=11578169

Funk told ABC News he wrote emails to the then-CEO of Mission Essential describing how job candidates would cheat on oral exams conducted over the phone. "I told him that it was corrupt. Stand-ins were taking the test. That's comparable to, if you're a lawyer, that's comparable to taking the bar exam over the phone. You need to be face-to-face with that individual. You need to identify them. You need to know who they are and they had stand-ins on the phone taking the test," Funk said. "They had stand-ins on the phone taking the test because there is no way that these people could possibly pass if they can't even get through an interview." One of the company's translators working in Afghanistan now confirmed the practice in an interview with ABC News, saying he personally had taken the exam for others who could not have passed it themselves. The employee, who described the practice on the condition he not be identified, called a follow-up written exam "bull."

### 1NC – Nuclear Terror !D

#### The risk of nuclear terror is one in 3 billion

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

### 2NC – Nuclear Terror !D

#### No risk or impact to nuclear terror – way too many barriers

Eaves 16 - Masters degree in international affairs from the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University (Elizabeth, “What Does "Nuclear Terrorism" Really Mean?” The Bulletin, 4/7, http://thebulletin.org/what-does-nuclear-terrorism-really-mean9309)

Least likely: a nuclear weapon. The reason the first scenario is improbable is that it’s difficult to steal, buy, or make a nuclear weapon. While there are about 10,000 nuclear warheads in the world, most are heavily guarded and don’t lie around fully assembled. To steal one would require the cooperation of more than just one corrupt or coerced person. Some policy analysts do worry that terrorists might be able to buy an atomic weapon from a nuclear power hostile to Western interests, perhaps North Korea or Pakistan. In 2013, though, political scientists Keir A. Lieber of Georgetown University and Daryl Press of Dartmouth College published one of the few papers to rigorously examine that likelihood and found the fear overblown. As they write, “a terrorist nuclear strike would not remain anonymous for long and would soon be traced back to the originating state.” Few national leaders are crazy or naïve enough to think they wouldn’t be found out, or that if they were, there wouldn’t be massive repercussions. As for building an atomic weapon, it’s unlikely that terrorists could make anything as sophisticated as the warheads owned by governments, but making a crude nuclear bomb—an improvised nuclear device, or IND—is “potentially within the capabilities of a technically sophisticated terrorist group,” according to the Belfer Center report. However, in addition to equipment and know-how, the atom-bomb-seeking terrorist would need—the largest obstacle—some quantity of either plutonium or highly enriched uranium (HEU). Highly enriched uranium is present in fewer than 25 countries, according to a new report from the Nuclear Threat Initiative. Even Al Qaeda, which in the 1990s and early 2000s had deep pockets, a centralized command structure, and many scientists in its employ, was not able to acquire material suitable for a nuclear weapon despite its best efforts. There have been reports of attempts to sell nuclear material in countries in the Black Sea area, but none has been successful, as far as has been made publicly known. Most likely: a dirty bomb. None of this is to suggest that the international community shouldn’t worry about the world’s nuclear arsenals; we would all be unequivocally safer if there were fewer atomic weapons and less nuclear-weapon-ready material around. But we’re far more likely to see the second scenario—a dirty bomb attack—than a nuclear explosion in the near future. So what will that look like? Nothing like the aftermath of a nuclear weapon attack. As the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission explains, “A dirty bomb is in no way similar to a nuclear weapon.” The latter relies on fission or fusion to create an explosion millions of times more powerful than the former. A nuclear bomb could spread radiation over hundreds of square miles, whereas a dirty bomb could only do so over a few square miles. Dirty bombs have more in common with nuclear medicine than nuclear war. A dirty bomb wouldn’t immediately kill any more people than an ordinary explosive. It is a weapon ideally suited to terrorism, though, part of the very purpose of which is to sow fear. In fact, in the perverse psychology of terrorism, a mere claim that a bomb had spread radioactive material would have some of the same effect as a bomb that actually did so.

#### No risk of nuclear terrorism---too many obstacles

John J. Mearsheimer 14, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, “America Unhinged”, January 2, nationalinterest.org/article/america-unhinged-9639?page=show

Am I overlooking the obvious threat that strikes fear into the hearts of so many Americans, which is terrorism? Not at all. Sure, the United States has a terrorism problem. But it is a minor threat. There is no question we fell victim to a spectacular attack on September 11, but it did not cripple the United States in any meaningful way and another attack of that magnitude is highly unlikely in the foreseeable future. Indeed, there has not been a single instance over the past twelve years of a terrorist organization exploding a primitive bomb on American soil, much less striking a major blow. Terrorism—most of it arising from domestic groups—was a much bigger problem in the United States during the 1970s than it has been since the Twin Towers were toppled.¶ What about the possibility that a terrorist group might obtain a nuclear weapon? Such an occurrence would be a game changer, but the chances of that happening are virtually nil. No nuclear-armed state is going to supply terrorists with a nuclear weapon because it would have no control over how the recipients might use that weapon. Political turmoil in a nuclear-armed state could in theory allow terrorists to grab a loose nuclear weapon, but the United States already has detailed plans to deal with that highly unlikely contingency.¶ Terrorists might also try to acquire fissile material and build their own bomb. But that scenario is extremely unlikely as well: there are significant obstacles to getting enough material and even bigger obstacles to building a bomb and then delivering it. More generally, virtually every country has a profound interest in making sure no terrorist group acquires a nuclear weapon, because they cannot be sure they will not be the target of a nuclear attack, either by the terrorists or another country the terrorists strike. Nuclear terrorism, in short, is not a serious threat. And to the extent that we should worry about it, the main remedy is to encourage and help other states to place nuclear materials in highly secure custody.

### 1NC – Cyber Terror !D

#### No cyber impact

Healey 13

/30 March 2013, Jason Healey is the Director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative at the Atlantic Council, *No, Cyberwarfare Isn't as Dangerous as Nuclear War*, www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/03/20/cyber-attacks-not-yet-an-existential-threat-to-the-us, spark//

America does not face an existential cyberthreat today, despite recent warnings. Our cybervulnerabilities are undoubtedly grave and the threats we face are severe but far from comparable to nuclear war. ¶ The most recent alarms come in a Defense Science Board report on how to make military cybersystems more resilient against advanced threats (in short, Russia or China). It warned that the "cyber threat is serious, with potential consequences similar in some ways to the nuclear threat of the Cold War." Such fears were also expressed by Adm. Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in 2011. He called cyber "The single biggest existential threat that's out there" because "cyber actually more than theoretically, can attack our infrastructure, our financial systems."¶ While it is true that cyber attacks might do these things, it is also true they have not only never happened but are far more difficult to accomplish than mainstream thinking believes. The consequences from cyber threats may be similar in some ways to nuclear, as the Science Board concluded, but mostly, they are incredibly dissimilar. ¶ Eighty years ago, the generals of the U.S. Army Air Corps were sure that their bombers would easily topple other countries and cause their populations to panic, claims which did not stand up to reality. A study of the 25-year history of cyber conflict, by the Atlantic Council and Cyber Conflict Studies Association, has shown a similar dynamic where the impact of disruptive cyberattacks has been consistently overestimated. ¶ Rather than theorizing about future cyberwars or extrapolating from today's concerns, the history of cyberconflict that have actually been fought, shows that cyber incidents have so far tended to have effects that are either widespread but fleeting or persistent but narrowly focused. No attacks, so far, have been both widespread and persistent. There have been no authenticated cases of anyone dying from a cyber attack. Any widespread disruptions, even the 2007 disruption against Estonia, have been short-lived causing no significant GDP loss. ¶ Moreover, as with conflict in other domains, cyberattacks can take down many targets but keeping them down over time in the face of determined defenses has so far been out of the range of all but the most dangerous adversaries such as Russia and China. Of course, if the United States is in a conflict with those nations, cyber will be the least important of the existential threats policymakers should be worrying about. Plutonium trumps bytes in a shooting war.¶ This is not all good news. Policymakers have recognized the problems since at least 1998 with little significant progress. Worse, the threats and vulnerabilities are getting steadily more worrying. Still, experts have been warning of a cyber Pearl Harbor for 20 of the 70 years since the actual Pearl Harbor. ¶ The transfer of U.S. trade secrets through Chinese cyber espionage could someday accumulate into an existential threat. But it doesn't seem so seem just yet, with only handwaving estimates of annual losses of 0.1 to 0.5 percent to the total U.S. GDP of around $15 trillion. That's bad, but it doesn't add up to an existential crisis or "economic cyberwar."

### 2NC – Cyber Terror !D

#### No impact to cyberattacks - closed networks, and action now.

Fritz 09

[Jason, BS (St. Cloud), MIR (Bond), Hacking Nuclear Command and Control, International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament, 7/7/2009, http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason\_Fritz\_Hacking\_NC2.pdf,Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are computer systems used for critical infrastructure such as energy grids, water management, waste treatment, transportation systems, emergency services, and communications.]

As of May 2009, no major cyber terror event has occurred. Policy makers, media organisations, and security companies often use the threat of cyber terrorism to further their own agendas. The entertainment industry has also capitalized on cyber fears, creating exaggerated and over simplistic scenarios, such as the films War Games and Die Hard 4. Additionally, the media often reports cyber criminals, hackers, statesponsored hackers, and hacktivists all under the heading of cyber terrorists. Sensitive government, military, and intelligence information tend to be maintained on closed networks, networks separated from the broader internet. While these systems may be compromised, they are far from simple. Governments are aware of the cyber threat, and have been taking steps to increase personnel screening, inspections, inter-agency communication, emergency response, scrutiny of sensitive hi-tech foreign parts production, and overall computer network defence.

#### No cyberterror - their evidence is hype.

Cavelty 08

[Myriam Dunn, Lecturer and Head of the new risks research unit at the Center for Security Studies, Cyber-Security and Threat Politics US efforts to secure the information age, http://www.crn.ethz.ch/\_docs\_public/Abstract\_CyberSec&ThreatPol.pdf]

The point is that all we have seen in the last couple of years suggests that computer network vulnerabilities are an increasingly serious business problem, but that the threat that they represent to national security has been overstated: despite the persuasiveness of the threat scenarios, cyber-threats have clearly not materialised as a ‘real’ national security threat. Moreover, it appears that on the whole, and measured in terms of the amount of total internet traffic, our modern, technology-based societies function exceptionally well, and the technological environment has been surprisingly stable, even though many disruptions with various strengths, be they accidental or intentional results of human agency, occur every day (Westrin 2001: 67–8). Thus, one might be inclined to ask whether we are really headed towards a point where a major, society-threatening chain reaction of IT-related events become highly likely or even unavoidable, as some claim (cf. Perrow 1984; Turner and Pidgeon 1997; Tainter 1988; Prothero 2001) – or whether technology rather helps us to evolve towards an increasingly robust society because complex societies are able to overcome crises more easily precisely as a result of their complexity and inbuilt redundancies (Homer- Dixon 2000: 203; LaPorte 1975). Regardless of the viewpoint taken, there seems to be no straight answer to the question of how vulnerable our modern societies really are. In fact, experts widely disagree how likely cyber-doom scenarios are and how serious a threat they constitute. The majority of official publications are not only very vague about the actual level of threat but also more generally have to leave cyberthreats shrouded in a cloud of speculation (Dunn 2007a, 2007b). This is not helped by poor definitions and careless use of terminology by many government officials, which has created a tendency to ‘hype’ the issue with rhetorical dramatisation and alarmist warnings. In an unhealthy symbiosis with the mass media – which repeatedly features sensationalist headlines on the topic – this has led to many writings that are full of words like ‘could’, ‘would’, and ‘maybe’ when describing the threat (Bendrath 2001: 83). At the same time, the considerable hype has created a growing countermovement of more cautious voices that try to be more specific in their estimates of the threat (cf. Lewis 2002; Wilson 2003). Many of the more technically educated political advisors and journalists have written about the practical difficulties of a serious cyber-attack or the inability of bureaucracies like militaries or intelligence agencies as well as many terrorist groups to really acquire the skills needed to become successful hackers (Ingles-le Nobel 1999; Center for the Study of Terrorism and Irregular Warfare 1999; Green 2002; Shea 2003). Others even consider the debate to be almost entirely dominated by hidden agendas and ‘fear-mongering’ and point to the fact that combating cyber-threats has not only become a highly politicised issue but also a lucrative one: an entire industry has emerged to grapple with the threat (Smith 1998, 2000; see also Weimann 2004a, 2004b; Bendrath 2001).

### 1NC – Bioterror !D

#### No bioterror—can’t mass produce, and no motivation

McComb 13- School of Graduate and Continuing Studies in Diplomacy Norwich University (Jonathan, “Closing Pandora’s Box: The Threat of Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction”, Global Security Studies, Winter 2013, Volume 4, Issue 1, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/McComb%20WMD.pdf)//WK

The CIA opined in 1983 that increasing state use of chemical and biological weapons had the potential to influence the attitudes of terrorists toward use of WMDs. The agency stated that production of chemical or biological weapons for a small-scale attack was technologically no more difficult than the production of narcotics or heroin, finding instead that the volume production required to inflict mass casualties would be much more formidable, citing considerable increase in safety requirements, cost, and the risk of discovery. (CIA, 1983). Japanese terrorist group Aum Shinrinkyo would test that theory in detail less than a decade later. The CIA found motivational and practical considerations, rather than technical obstacles, had to that point accounted for the lower levels of terrorist use of WMDs, citing accessibility, flexibility, and control considerations, as compared to conventional small arms and explosives. The agency additionally cited the potential for increased public alienation as a result of widespread indiscriminate killing by WMDs.

### 2NC – Bioterror !D

#### No bioweapons

Ouagrham-Gormley 14 Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley is Assistant Professor of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University. She worked for a decade at the Monterey Institute for International Studies. She was for two years research director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies office in Kazakhstan and was founding editor of the International Export Control Observer, Cornell University Press, November 2014, “Barriers to Bioweapons”, http://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/?GCOI=80140100857780

In both the popular imagination and among lawmakers and national security experts, there exists the belief that with sufficient motivation and material resources, states or terrorist groups can produce bioweapons easily, cheaply, and successfully. In Barriers to Bioweapons, Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley challenges this perception by showing that bioweapons development is a difficult, protracted, and expensive endeavor, rarely achieving the expected results whatever the magnitude of investment. Her findings are based on extensive interviews she conducted with former U.S. and Soviet-era bioweapons scientists and on careful analysis of archival data and other historical documents related to various state and terrorist bioweapons programs. Bioweapons development relies on living organisms that are sensitive to their environment and handling conditions, and therefore behave unpredictably. These features place a greater premium on specialized knowledge. Ben Ouagrham-Gormley posits that lack of access to such intellectual capital constitutes the greatest barrier to the making of bioweapons. She integrates theories drawn from economics, the sociology of science, organization, and management with her empirical research. The resulting theoretical framework rests on the idea that the pace and success of a bioweapons development program can be measured by its ability to ensure the creation and transfer of scientific and technical knowledge. The specific organizational, managerial, social, political, and economic conditions necessary for success are difficult to achieve, particularly in covert programs where the need to prevent detection imposes managerial and organizational conditions that conflict with knowledge production.

#### They can’t turn the basic science into *effective weapons*

Ouagrham-Gormley 14 Sonia Ben Ouagrham-Gormley is Assistant Professor of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University. She worked for a decade at the Monterey Institute for International Studies. She was for two years research director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies office in Kazakhstan and was founding editor of the International Export Control Observer, Shannon R. Fye, Public Policy @ GMU, Frontiers of Public Health, September 24, 2014, “Restricted Science”, http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fpubh.2014.00158/full

The NSABB’s initial decision to edit the H5N1-related article before its publication was followed by the Dutch government’s decision to impose export-control restrictions on the Dutch team’s article. Dutch authorities claimed that the research fell under European Council Regulation EC 428/2009, which attempts to prevent the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons by requiring an export license before publication (10). These moves are based on the assumption that innovations achieved in the laboratory can be easily fashioned into a harmful agent or a bioweapon. Yet, past bioweapons work shows that transforming a scientific concept developed in the laboratory into a product that has a specific, applied purpose, and functions reliably and effectively can take several decades and require a variety of expertise. Specifically, the passage from laboratory concept to specific application faces the challenge of scaling-up fragile microorganisms for large-scale production and developing a delivery mechanism that will protect the agents from environmental degradation when released as a weapon. For example, within the Soviet bioweapons program, the development of an antibiotic-resistant strain of the bacterium that causes plague took 20 years to achieve and involved teams at three institutes. Scaling-up anthrax and smallpox weapons took Soviet researchers about 5 years to achieve and required the involvement of large teams of scientists, including the designers of the original strains. And within the U.S. bioweapons program, scientists discovered that the botulinum toxin weapon they had produced eventually lost some of its toxicity upon aerosol release. These examples demonstrate that laboratory successes do not necessarily lead to successful application to a specific purpose. Instead, specialized skills honed over years of practice in production and weaponization work are critical to success (11).

### 1NC – Instability !D

#### No risk of Afghan collapse

**Baldauf 12** — staff writer at the Christian Science Monitor (Scott, “Even if NATO rushes to the exits, Afghan collapse is not inevitable”, Christian Science Monitor, 5/25/2012, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Keep-Calm/2012/0525/Even-if-NATO-rushes-to-the-exits-Afghan-collapse-is-not-inevitable-video/, Deech)

But, as security experts in Kabul told me on a recent reporting trip, the major lesson of the past 100 years or so is that insurgencies, while deadly, rarely succeed in Afghanistan without major outside support. Without British support, former Afghan King Shah Shuja could not retake power in Kabul by force in 1832 and 1833. Without Soviet backing, the Khalq and Parcham parties would have been unable to launch their urban coup d’etat of April 1978, killing President Daoud, and paving the way for a Soviet invasion in 1979. Without US-supplied arms, Pakistani training and logistical support, and Saudi funding, the Afghan mujahideen and foreign fighters who fought the Soviet occupation of the 1980s would have remained a village nuisance. The current group of insurgents, a coalition of Taliban fighters, Hizb-e-Islami veterans, Al Qaeda adventurists, and tribal militias from Pakistan’s North Waziristan region, have a proven ability to blow stuff up. They have also managed to make certain areas of the country, such as the southeastern provinces of Khost and Paktika and the far eastern provinces of Konar and Nooristan no-go areas, not only for Western aid groups, but even for Afghan troops. (See a provincial map of Afghanistan here.) But these groups, coming from different tribes, regions, and ideological backgrounds, show signs of being every bit as disunified and undisciplined as the various factions that make up the current Karzai government. Their ability to take, hold, and govern Afghan cities is still unproven, and given their preference for guerrilla warfare, instead of large coordinated set-piece battles, this ability is very much in doubt. Barring a complete dissolution of the Afghan National Army – a potentiality that is entirely possible without stronger national leadership – a small disparate undisciplined guerrilla force like the Taliban is likely to spend the next decade as they have the past decade: in small dusty villages, far from the halls of power. In short, if the Afghan Army – even as ill prepared as they currently are – simply remain in their bases, lacking French or other NATO trainers, it will be very difficult for the Taliban to dislodge them. Inertia, as well as time, is on the Afghan government’s side.

### 2NC – Instability !D

#### Regional cooperation will prevent escalation

Innocent and Carpenter 9 (Malou, Foreign Policy Analyst – Cato Institute and Ted Galen, Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies – Cato Institute, “Escaping the Graveyard of Empires: A Strategy to Exist Afghanistan”, http://www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/escaping-graveyard-empires-strategy-exit-afghanistan.pdf)

Additionally, regional stakeholders, especially Russia and Iran, have an interest in a stable Afghanistan. Both countries possess the capacity to facilitate development in the country and may even be willing to assist Western forces. In July, leaders in Moscow allowed the United States to use Russian airspace to transport troops and lethal military equipment into Afghanistan. Yet another relevant regional player is the Collective Security Treaty Organization, made up of Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, and Belarus. At the moment, CSTO appears amenable to forging a security partnership with NATO. CSTO secretary general Nikolai Bordyuzha told journalists in March 2009 of his bloc’s intention to cooperate. “The united position of the CSTO is that we should give every kind of aid to the anti-terror coalition operating in Afghanistan. . . . The interests of NATO and the CSTO countries regarding Afghanistan conform unequivocally.”83 Mutual interests between Western forces and Afghanistan’s surrounding neighbors can converge on issues of transnational terrorism, the Caspian and Central Asia region’s abundant energy resources, cross-border organized crime, and weapons smuggling. Enhanced cooperation alone will not stabilize Afghanistan, but engaging stakeholders may lead to tighter regional security.

#### Afghan stability resilient

Robichaud 7 (Carl, Program Officer – The Century Foundation, “Buying Time in Afghanistan”, World Policy Journal, 11-8, http://www.tcf.org/publications/internationalaffairs/RobichaudWPJ.pdf)

Afghanistan is increasingly seen as Iraq in slow motion. It is not. The headlines of car bombs and casualty tolls echo eachother**,** but mask deep differences in each society and in the dynamics of each insurgency. As Iraq has descended into civil war, Afghanistan’s center has held. The government remains weak, but power holders and the public showno appetitefora return to internecine fighting. The insurgency remains solvent because of safe havens across the border in Pakistan, but has been unable to expand upon its toehold in Afghanistan or offer a compelling alternative to the status quo. In the short-run, theonly wayAfghanistan could capsize is if the ballast of international support is withdrawn. Unfortunately, this scenario seems increasingly likely. The Taliban are fond of saying that “the Americans have watches, but we have time.”1 A quarter of the United States public now favors a pullout from Afghanistan in the next year if things do not improve, and an additional 40 percent believes troops should be withdrawn “as quickly as possible,” if a basic level of stability is achieved. Polls in Canada, Britain, and the Netherlands— the NATO countries which are shouldering the alliance’s military burden in the volatile South—suggest about half of those surveyed want troops withdrawn within a year.2 In Germany, two thirds of the public now opposes its military contribution, and in February a dispute over Afghanistan collapsed the center-left Prodi government in Italy. National leaders continue to assert that “we cannot afford to lose” in Afghanistan, but many of their constituents believe they already have.

### 1NC – Indo-Pak !D

#### *Zero risk* of India-Pakistan conflict---*deterrence* checks escalation

S. Paul Kapur & Sumit Ganguly 16, Professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, Affiliate at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a Visiting Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi AND Professor of Political Science at University of Indiana-Bloomington, “India, Pakistan and the Unlikely Dream of a Nuclear-Free South Asia,” Global Nuclear Disarmament: Strategic, Political, and Regional Perspectives, edited by Nik Hynek & Michal Smetana, pp. 273-274, Google Books

This minimalist approach is changing, however. Today, India is increasing all aspects of its nuclear weapons capability. For example, India is expanding fissile material production: India and Pakistan are the only countries in the world that are currently believed to be doing so (Crail 2011). India probably possesses enough weapons-grade plutonium to produce 100—130 nuclear warheads. It is increasing its production capacity with projects such as an unsafeguarded fast breeder reactor under construction near Kalpakkam (Kristensen and Norris 2012). The Indians are also improving their weapons-delivery capabilities. For example, the Agni V intermediate range ballistic missile, which the Indians recently tested, will have a range of approximately 5000 km, enabling it to reach targets anywhere in China. The BRAHMOS cruise missile, jointly developed with Russia, will be able to strike targets at ranges of 300—500km with conventional or nuclear warheads at supersonic speeds (Rahyuhin 2012). The Indians are also working to acquire sea-based launch capabilities, in addilion to land- and air-based platforms, to ensure that they are able to field a full nuclear triad (Davenport 2012; Kristensen and Norris 2012: 96).

India is doing this mainly for security-related reasons — reasons largely unconnected with its oft-cited nemesis, Pakistan. Although analysts tend to focus their attention on the Indo-Pakistani conflict, the Pakistanis do not pose a serious, long-term strategic threat to India. The rivalry between the two countries is, of course, real. They have fought four wars against each other and they continue to battle one another over the territory of Kashmir, where Pakistan supports an anti-Indian insurgency; they have also trained sizable nuclear arsenals on one another.10 Nonetheless, Pakistan suffers from too many handicaps to pose a significant strategic threat. These include economic stagnation, sectarian and ethnic violence, a relatively small territorial and population base, and a dysfunctional government that is increasingly unable to provide its people with basic public goods (Lieven 201 1: 3—40; Bajoria 2009).

In the military realm, Pakistan possesses highly capable conventional and nuclear forces. These forces, however, are mainly defensive and seek to prevent India from leveraging its superior conventional military capabilities to attack Pakistan." In addition to its strategic nuclear arsenal, Pakistan is developing a battlefield nuclear capacity consisting of small, short-range weapons stationed close to the Indo-Pakistani border. This will increase the likelihood of nuclear escalation in the event of any Indo- Pakistani conventional confrontation and may discourage India from undertaking aggressive military action against Pakistan (Khan 2011: 279; Basrur 2011). There is little likelihood, however, even with the addition of a battlefield capability, that Pakistan will be able to use its nuclear weapons to capture significant portions of Indian territory, to erode India's nuclear second-strike capability, or otherwise to achieve coercive leverage over India.

### 2NC – Indo-Pak !D

#### India’s deterrence capabilities are incredible right now- deter conflict

Jain 16- Akshita Jain, Writes about Indian news for First Post, 2016 (“INS Arihant 'quietly' commissioned into service: Is India sending out a subtle message?”, First Post, October 18th, <http://www.firstpost.com/india/ins-arihant-quietly-commissioned-into-service-is-india-sending-out-a-subtle-message-3058412.html>, Accessed 08-30-2017 // GHS-JK)

India's first indigenously-constructed nuclear submarine INS Arihant was quietly commissioned into service in August and it has been operational since then, according to recent reports. It was launched in 2009 by then prime minister Manmohan Singh and has undergone a series of vigorous tests since then. Some sources told The Times of Indiathat the vessel is "not yet fully ready" to be deployed for "deterrent patrols" with nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles in its four silos. It was formally commissioned by Navy Chief Admiral Sunil Lamba and with its commission, India has quietly completed its nuclear triad. The Hindu cites some defence sources as saying that to maintain secrecy, the vessel is still not being called INS Arihant. INS stands for 'Indian Naval Ship' and is used as a prefix only after a ship has been inducted into the navy. Arihant is India's first nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine and is propelled by an 83 MW pressurised light-water reactor at its core. Russia helped scientists at the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) in miniaturising the reactor to fit into the 10-metre-wide hull of the nuclear submarine. It is capable of carrying nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, the class referred to as Ship Submersible Ballistic Nuclear (SSBN). These are designed to cruise the waters carrying nuclear weapons and provides a nation, The Hindu report adds, with an assured second strike capability, which, put simply, is the ability to retaliate after taking a nuclear hit. The vessel will be armed with the K-15 missiles, which can carry nuclear warheads to a range of 750 kilometres, and with K4 missile, which has a longer range, according to a Business Standard report. The K-4 ballistic missile has a range of 3,500 km and Arihant has four vertical launch tubes. It can either carry 12 K-15 missiles or four larger K-4 missiles. The design of Arihant is based on the Russian Akula-1 class submarines, of which the best-known example is the INS Chakra. It will weigh around 6,000 tonnes. India is set to join the elite squad of countries like Russia, China, France that possess nuclear-powered submarines.

### 1NC – Sino-India !D

#### No Sino-India conflict—conventional and nuclear deterrence check

Richards 2015 – Marine Engineer Officer who has served in the Royal Australian Navy for 26 Years (Commodore Katherine, February, China-India: An analysis of the Himalayan territorial dispute, The Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, <http://www.defence.gov.au/ADC/Publications/IndoPac/Richards%20final%20IPSD%20paper.pdf>)

However, Fravel counters this view and states that China has been ‘less belligerent than leading¶ theories of international relations might have predicted for a state with its characteristics’,¶ further noting that:¶ For scholars of offensive realism, China has rarely exploited its military superiority either to¶ bargain hard territory that it claims or to seize it through force. China has likewise not become¶ increasingly aggressive in managing its territorial disputes as its relative military and economic¶ power has grown since 1990.199¶ Moreover, Jonathan Holslag surmises that the overall strategy of both nations is to maintain the¶ balance of power in the border area and that this balance is ‘nourished’ by small-scale incursions¶ and the build-up of military infrastructure.200 He further argues that both sides are not looking¶ for military supremacy along the border, although ‘they are seeking … to develop the capability to¶ react flexibly on a wide range of challenges’.201 For China, such challenges include combating¶ Tibetan separatism, while for India, Pakistan continues to be a constant source of irritation.¶ On balance, ‘an all-out conflict, although possible, appears improbable because it could spiral into¶ nuclear war and would upset the prevailing harmonious development model adopted by both¶ sides’.202 Hence a combination of conventional and nuclear deterrence serves to keep hostilities¶ in check. Furthermore, as China and India are both ‘vulnerable to potential acts of hostility’, a¶ ‘multi-level soft deterrence’ is now a feature of the relationship.203 In the border dispute, China’s¶ key vulnerability is Tibet and India’s is Pakistan, which makes the potential cost of conflict¶ extremely high for both nations.¶ Thus India’s and China’s military modernisations have created a ‘stronger security¶ interdependence’, suggesting the current security dilemma ‘will not bring peace, but it will lead¶ to a precarious form of stability as the costs of war rise significantly on both sides of the¶ Himalayas’.204 In effect, the military power of both nations will assist in perpetuating the¶ stalemate, wherein the dispute will continue to fester, albeit within bounds.¶ In many ways, the Sino-Indian border dispute highlights the limitations of military power. Yet¶ today, China and India are also bound by ‘the challenge of piloting a third of the world’s¶ population into the global economy’.205 So what does this great economic endeavor mean for¶ their relationship and, more specifically, for the prospects of resolution of the dispute? The next¶ part of this paper examines the role of economic forces and whether or not these forces could aid¶ in breaking the deadlock.

### 2NC – Sino-India !D

#### No confrontation – multiple checks

Gupta 2013 (Sourabh Gupta – Senior Research Associate at Samuels International Associates, Inc., 5/19, “China–India ties: lessons from a Himalayan standoff”, East Asia Forum, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013> /05/19/china-india-ties-lessons-from-a-himalayan-standoff/)

It is remarkable the sort of anxiety that a handful of lightly armed People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers and their dog can educe on a disputed frontier. On 15 April three dozen or so such soldiers, many miles removed from reinforcement or logistical support, pitched their tents in a demonstrative assertion of presence at a barren — albeit sensitive — frontier point a dozen miles inside what New Delhi considers to be the Line of Actual Control (LAC) on their disputed border. Alarmist commentary immediately latched on to familiar tropes of Chinese assertiveness, territorial revisionism and the need for President Xi to establish his hard-line credentials, among others. Just as opinion was being softened to contemplate a prolonged occupation along supposedly the most dangerous border in the world, a telephone call from National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon to his counterpart in Beijing, State Councillor Yang Jiechi, wound down the three-week-long impasse to the satisfaction of both sides. Crisis communications channels institutionalised during a recent warming trend in relations — a foreign ministry director general-level border mechanism, special representatives-level links — functioned as intended. Activation of the prime ministers-level hotline was not required. By comparison, China’s months-long control of the disputed Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea and its law enforcement assertions in Senkaku territorial waters continue unabated with institutional mechanisms to manage such crises practically non-existent. Frosty bilateral relations make this state of affairs unlikely to be reversed. A code of conduct in the South China Sea and a maritime communication mechanism in the East China Sea will first require that Manila and Tokyo engender an element of political quiet and trust in their respective relationships with Beijing. The origins of the stand-off in the Ladakh Himalayas are in the recent construction of permanent structures by the Indian side at a (separate but) similarly sensitive forward observation point in the disputed western sector — a violation, for the Chinese side, of long-standing border protocols. That the Indian post abuts an arterial road link (Aksai Chin highway) that connects Xinjiang to Tibet prompted Beijing to establish its own skeletal presence barely two-dozen miles removed from the strategic China-India-Pakistan border tri-junction area. With both sides having telegraphed their respective strengths and sensitivities, the PLA presence and the Indian construction activity were thereafter withdrawn. Provocative probes and presence-marking operations that were implicitly directed at undermining China’s control of the strategic Aksai Chin highway, a core strategic interest, at a time when Tibet was in ferment, had been a key precipitating cause of the Sino-Indian war of 1962. Rather than submit to the errors of the past, as some quarters short-sightedly counselled, the Manmohan Singh government displayed exemplary patience and sensitivity in acknowledging the shared nature of the strategic vulnerabilities along the Sino-Indian frontier. That India’s boundary policy is framed within a long-standing context of strict bilateralism with no scope for third-party interference or instigation — despite the asymmetry in power — was surely a helpful factor too. Both China and India have sought to minimise the incident as an isolated case. Beijing’s known irritation for some time though over the Indian forward observation post in eastern Ladakh suggests that the timing of the stand-off — coming in the advent of Premier Li Keqiang’s inaugural visit to India — was anything but accidental. Rather it was intended to politically test and establish the Singh government’s commitment at its highest reaches to Sino-Indian relationship management as well as anticipate the degree of reciprocity that Beijing can expect as it embarks on what is likely to be an active —and favourable — phase in Sino-Indian boundary negotiations. In Shivshankar Menon, New Delhi’s Special Representative (SR) on the boundary talks, Beijing will find a willing counterpart consummately versed in resolving the dispute from a principles-based, strategic perspective and wholly committed to fashioning a productive equation with rising Chinese power. As Beijing’s earlier misgivings of a pro-American tilt in India’s strategic orientation have eased, a horizon of opportunity to reach workable transitional solutions to the boundary dispute has also opened up. New Delhi’s reluctance to be appended to a revised Quadrilateral Initiative in any way, shape or form suggests that it too shares a similar view of the opportunity at hand. New Delhi’s casual flirtation with the Quad and its China-encirclement connotations in May 2007, it bears remembering, was a key trigger for the cyclical downturn in ties. In January 2012, a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs was finalised following an in-principle understanding reached at the 2011 Sanya BRICS Summit. When Prime Minister Singh pays a return visit to China later this year — a rare instance of back-to-back premier-level visits that has not occurred since 1954 — a Beijing-prompted Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA), which does away with the most persistent day-to-day irritants along the LAC, is expected to be signed. A joint agreed record of the SR-level boundary deliberations, serving as a guidepost for future negotiations and a basis for working out an understanding on the alignment of the LAC, is also expected to be finalised.

### 1NC – Russia !D

#### *No Russian expansionism* — not interested in conquering

**Bandow, 12** (Doug, senior fellow at the Cato Institute, specializing in foreign policy and civil liberties, “Op Ed: NATO and Libya: It’s Time To Retire a Fading Alliance”, 1/2/12, http://feb17.info/editorials/op-ed-nato-and-libya-its-time-to-retire-a-fading-alliance/)

The Cold War required an extraordinary defense commitment from the U.S. But no longer. Europe still matters, but it faces no genuine military threat. Whatever happens politically in Moscow, there will be no Red Army pouring armored divisions through Germany’s Fulda Gap. Washington has much to worry about, but Europe is not on the list. Of course, the Europeans still have geopolitical concerns. Civil wars in the Balkans and Libya threatened refugee flows and economic disruption. However, the Europeans are capable of handling such issues. Potentially more dangerous is the situation in Eastern Europe and beyond, most notably Georgia and Ukraine. But not dangerous to America. The U.S. has survived most of its history with these lands successively part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. Nor is there any evidence that Russia wants to forcibly reincorporate its “lost” territories into a renewed Soviet empire. Rather, Moscow appears to have retrogressed to a “great power” like Imperial Russia. The new Russia is concerned about international respect and border security. Threaten that, and war might result, as Georgia learned in 2008.

### 2NC – Russia !D

#### No risk of Russian expansionism or aggression --- they’re far too weak

**Kaplan and Kaplan 11** – Robert D. Kaplan 11 is a national correspondent for The Atlantic and a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, AND Stephen S. Kaplan is a research associate in the Brookings Institution, “America Primed” Feb 23 http://nationalinterest.org/article/america-primed-4892

But this last scenario, among the worst anyone can come up with, is not at all dismal. Consider this: had power in Russia at a particularly fragile moment in 1917 not been wrested by the Bolsheviks, it is entirely possible---likely even---that (over the course of the twentieth century) Russia would have evolved into a poorer, slightly more corrupt and unstable version of France and Germany, anchored to Europe, where most of Russia’s population is in any case located. The seventy-year Bolshevik interregnum which created a non-European empire is now past, the strongly European configuration of Russian demography remains unchanged, and now–Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s fitfully modernizing national-security state has no ideology to impose outside its borders, nor troops available to permanently occupy Eastern Europe like it did during the Cold War. In short, Russia is demographically tied to the Continent but finds it hard to dominate it. Meanwhile, Germany, as its economy and power amplify, may be forced to become a normal regional actor able to balance against Russia; in the process it might lose its quasi pacifism. Moreover, Moscow, as a fading European power, presents the United States with options because of Russia’s own manifold insecurities. Any new Russian empire will be a weak reincarnation of previous ones, limited not only by Chinese influence in the Russian Far East but by Chinese political and economic influence in Muslim Central Asia as well. Newly vibrant states like China, India, Turkey, Poland and Kazakhstan are already containing Russia after a fashion. America’s goal must be to support Russia’s consolidation of its own Far East, so that China will feel less secure on land and consequently be unable to so completely devote its energies to sea power. Balancing against Russia in Europe and yet helping it abroad is the kind of subtle strategy that would help guard against any one nation achieving the level of dominance elsewhere that America already enjoys in the Western Hemisphere.

#### Or *expansion inevitable* --- Russian geography

Stratfor 8 (“The Russian Resurgence and the New-Old Front”, 9-15,

http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20080915\_russian\_resurgence\_and\_new\_old\_front)

Russia is attempting to reforge its Cold War-era influence in its near abroad. This is not simply an issue of nostalgia, but a perfectly logical and predictable reaction to the Russian environment. Russia lacks easily definable, easily defendable borders. There is no redoubt to which the Russians can withdraw, and the only security they know comes from establishing buffers — buffers which tend to be lost in times of crisis. The alternative is for Russia to simply trust other states to leave it alone. Considering Russia’s history of occupations, from the Mongol horde to Napoleonic France to Hitler’s Germany, it is not difficult to surmise why the Russians tend to choose a more activist set of policies.

### 1NC – NATO !D

#### No impact to NATO collapse

Gallagher 3 (Michael, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Winter, Houston Journal of Int’l Law)

NATO’s supporters argue that ending NATO will destabilize Europe. Ending NATO, they claim, will destroy the transatlantic link between the United States and Europe, and isolate the United States from Europe. The ties of history, however, prevent this outcome. The United States has long enjoyed a “special relationship” with the United Kingdom. The United States also has strong relations with such nations as Italy, Turkey, Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. Some claim that NATO is the foremost expression of U.S. commitment to Europe. The United States, however, aided Europe in two world wars, and stood firmly by Europe’s side during the Cold War – this commitment surpasses diplomatic formalities. The United States will not isolate itself from Europe merely because NATO disbands. Additionally, European nations do not need a formal security link to the United States. Even with NATO gone, “there is still plenty of life in, and need for, [the United States-Europe security] partnership.”

### 2NC – NATO !D

#### EU fill-in solves any NATO impact

Tertrais 4 (Bruno, Senior Research Fellow – Foundation for Strategic Research, Washington Quarterly, Spring)

A Europe-wide security guarantee already exists. In 1947, France and the United Kingdom allied themselves against the possible resurgence of German nationalism in the Pact of Dunkirk. The following year, this arrangement was enlarged to include three other European nations (Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) and became the Brussels Treaty, which includes a commitment to use military force if one of the treaty's parties is attacked. The Brussels Treaty was modified in 1954 to include Germany and Italy and remains in force today. Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty provided the basis for the Washington Treaty's own Article 5, which is less demanding because it does not automatically commit NATO members to military assistance. Emboldened by their common perception of the Iraq war and the evolution of U.S. policy, several countries in the EU, including France and Germany, are tempted to deepen their defense cooperation independently of the United States and NATO. Although the degree to which the EU's defense policy should be independent from NATO and the United States is still a point of contention among Europeans and a touchy subject in transatlantic circles, consensus holds that, in the case of a regional crisis, the EU should not be impotent if Washington chose not to intervene. More recently, the EU made the historical decision to include a security clause in its draft constitution that amounts to a mutual security guarantee with the possibility of military assistance. The formulation agreed on by EU governments in December 2003 states: If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under NATO, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence.n20 The EU thus increasingly appears to be a real security alliance, and it may in fact be among the most solid ones imaginable, given its roots in strong economic, legal, and political integration. Thus, in the midst of the decline of other Western, permanent multinational alliances, the EU's emerging common defense policy appears one of the most original and interesting developments in the long history of military alliances. If NATO were to decline further in importance for Europeans, the continent would not be left without a security guarantee. In fact, in spite of the wishes of all alliance members, the existence of such an EU security clause could even be a logical consistency contributing toward NATO's decreased importance in the future.

### 1NC – NATO Resilient

#### Collapse impossible – inertia and common ties sustain NATO

Tertrais 4 (Bruno, Senior Research Fellow – Foundation for Strategic Research, Washington Quarterly, Spring)

Overall, there are therefore good reasons to believe that the Atlantic Alliance will survive despite internal strains. NATO still serves important functions for its members.n18 It has proven successful at adapting and undertaking new missions of peace support. Threats to Europe have not disappeared, and although a resurgent Russian threat does not appear all that credible at the moment, the alliance still serves an important function by reassuring new members. NATO also remains a vehicle of U.S. influence on the European continent, particularly on the eastern part today. There is also inertia. Contrary to other multilateral alliances of the Cold War, NATO created a large civilian and military bureaucracy, and history teaches us that large institutions do not die easily. One overall explanation for this resilience is simply the fact that, despite disagreements and misunderstandings, Americans and Europeans have much more in common from a political, economic, and cultural point of view than, say, the United States and its Asian allies. Such is the reason why NATO now is and will probably remain the only U.S.-led multilateral alliance standing.

### 2NC – NATO Resilient

#### NATO is strong and resilient

RIA 6 (Regulatory Intelligence Agency, 12-21, Lexis)

WASHINGTON, Dec. 21, 2006 - The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is healthy and its best years lie ahead, Marine Gen. James L. Jones said today at the Europe Atlantic Council here. Jones stepped down as NATO's supreme allied commander earlier this month. While some aspects of the alliance may need work, Jones said that, on the whole, it is an "incredibly healthy organization." Jones assumed his office in January 2003 after serving as the commandant of the Marine Corps. During his time in the position, the alliance has changed dramatically. "Perhaps the highlight of the last four years was witnessing the accession of seven new nations into the alliance in 2004," he said. "It was a very emotional moment for seven former Warsaw Pact countries." Membership in NATO meant acceptance in the free world to the former communist countries, Jones said. "There was a sort of palpable enthusiasm for freedom, democracy, rule of law and just the vast potential for those people that had been unleashed," he said. "You feel every day their enthusiasm from these new members." During Jones' tenure, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan grew from a force providing security in and around the Afghan capital of Kabul, to providing security for the entire country. The NATO commander in Afghanistan now commands 32,000 troops from 32 different countries, Jones said. The NATO mission in Afghanistan and NATO training mission in Iraq are just two operations that show the term "out of area operations" is obsolete, he said. During the Cold War, NATO's job was to defend Western Europe from the menace of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. There were no "out-of-area operations, nor was the possibility even really contemplated," he said. "It is a given that NATO is operating today on three different continents with more than 50,000 troops committed to NATO missions," he said. Troops under NATO command operate in Asia, Africa and Europe, and Jones said the alliance is also embracing change. "Nowhere was that more in evidence than in establishing the NATO Response Force," he said. The force - 25,000 personnel ready to deploy at a moment's notice - is now fully operational and capable. The general said the force is NATO's greatest commitment to transformation. The force is ready to "take on missions at a strategic distance, but in an expeditionary manner," he said. The NATO Response Force's first real deployment - to Pakistan to help with humanitarian relief following the earthquakes in January 2005 - is a prime example of this, Jones said. The fact that the force's first mission was a humanitarian operation has also caused some reassessment in NATO, he said. "NATO is reinventing itself and re-explaining itself because in this world NATO is thought of, correctly, as principally a warfighting organization," he said. "This transformation of NATO - going from a reactive 20th-century force, which it needed to be, to a 21st-century more expeditionary and agile force - brings with a whole lot of things" that countries didn't realize when they signed up for the process in 2002. "It has caused a lot of pain because it gets you into such things as multinational logistics (and) organic intelligence, which NATO has never had," he said. Other transformational aspects during Jones' command included eliminating duplicate NATO headquarters, disestablishing the Alled Command Atlantic and replacing it with the Allied Command Transformation and placing all operations under Allied Command Europe. This is not to say there are not problems that NATO must address, Jones said. First and foremost is money. The per capita share of many countries has actually gone down since the Prague Summit in 2002. NATO nations agreed during that summit to spend roughly 3 percent of their gross domestic product on defense. Another problem is national caveats, Jones said. This is where troops assigned to a mission has such stringent restrictions placed on them, that commanders can hardly use them. But the alliance is remarkably adaptable and resilient, Jones said. "The other bit of evidence that the alliance is healthy is that I know of no countries that are trying to leave the alliance," Jones said. "And I know quite a few that are trying to queue up and measure up to become members by as early as 2008."

#### Past events prove NATO is resilient

Corn 7 (Tony, Ph.D. – University of Paris and Graduate – U.S. Naval War College, “The Revolution in Transatlantic Affairs”, Real Clear Politics, 8-21, http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/08/the\_revolution\_in\_transatlanti.html)

If the Alliance survived a debacle of the magnitude of Suez in 1956, it can withstand anything. The main danger for NATO therefore is not military failure or even a Suez-like temporary political meltdown, but something more insidious. Over time, what an ill-conceived globalization of NATO could lead to is the transformation of the tactical coalition that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization currently is into a strategic “NATO of the East” while at the same time perverting the Atlantic Alliance into, so to speak, a “SEATO of the West” — namely, a make-believe alliance with no viable strategy (because a conventional military configuration is irrelevant when the threats are of the asymmetric variety) and no coherent policy (because the interests of the global members are simply too heterogeneous to ever converge.) The Long War promises to be a thinking man’s war. As a full-fledged Alliance, NATO possesses the kind of staying power that mere ad hoc coalitions cannot deliver; but NATO still has to come to terms with the fact that thinking power will matter more than fighting power. If NATO is to avoid the twofold danger of the SCO becoming a NATO of the East while NATO becomes a mere SEATO of the West, the Alliance will have first of all to downgrade its “toolbox” dimension and beef up its “think-tank” dimension.

## Iraq Advantage

### 1NC – ISIS Ded

#### ISIS lost – they’re not a threat

CBS 18, “ISIS beaten, U.S. troops reportedly start Iraq drawdown”, https://www.cbsnews.com/news/iraq-us-troops-drawdown-ap-military-declares-isis-beaten-afghanistan/

An Iraqi government spokesman and U.S. contractors in the country told the Associated Press on Monday that American forces had begun a drawdown from Iraq following Baghdad's declaration of victory over ISIS militants. Government spokesman Saad al-Hadithi said "the battle against Daesh has ended and so the level of the American presence will be reduced." Daesh is the Arabic language acronym for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). U.S. military spokesman Col. Ryan Dillon did not deny the report to CBS News, but would only say that the U.S.-led military coalition's presence in Iraq "will be conditions-based, proportional to the need" and determined "in coordination with the government of Iraq." Al-Hadithi stressed to the AP that the drawdown is still in its early stages and at present does not mark the beginning of a complete withdrawal of U.S. forces. The United States first launched airstrikes against ISIS in Iraq in August 2014 and in the following years closely backed key Iraqi military victories, including the retaking of Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city. ISIS swept across vast swaths of northern Iraq and neighboring Syria in the summer of 2014, carving out its own self-styled Muslim "caliphate." It has now lost control of all significant population centers that it held in both countries.

### 2NC – ISIS DED

#### ISIS took the L – they’re completely eradicated from Iraq

AP 17, Associated Press, “Iraq says war against ISIS is over: 'Your land' is liberated”, <https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/iraq-says-its-war-against-isis-has-ended-n828041>

After more than three years of combat operations, Iraq announced Saturday that the fight against the Islamic State group is over after the country's security forces drove the extremists from all of the territory they once held. Iraqi and American officials warned, however, that key challenges remain despite the military victory. Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi formally announced the victory in an address to the nation aired on Iraqi state television Saturday evening. "Honorable Iraqis, your land has been completely liberated," he said. "The liberation dream has become a reality. We achieved victory in difficult circumstances and with God's help, the steadfastness of our people and the bravery of our heroic forces we prevailed." "The flag of Iraq is flying high today over all Iraqi territory and at the farthest point on the border," he added, standing before the most senior members of Iraq's security forces. Following al-Abadi's remarks, his office declared a public holiday Sunday in celebration of the victory, according to an official statement from the prime minister's office. Iraqi forces mopped up the last pockets of IS fighters from Iraq's western deserts Saturday, securing the country's border with Syria, a step that marked the end of combat operations against the extremists. "All Iraqi lands are liberated from terrorist Daesh gangs and our forces completely control the international Iraqi-Syrian border," said Lt. Gen. Abdul-Amir Rasheed Yar Allah, a senior Iraqi military commander, in a statement Saturday afternoon.

#### ISIS is wrecked in Syria and Iraq

Patrick Cockburn 18, award-winning writer on The Independent who specialises in analysis of Iraq, Syria and wars in the Middle East, “Preview 2018: After a string of defeats in Iraq and Syria what 2018 means for Isis”, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-defeat-syria-latest-iraq-2018-survive-a8107891.html

Isis has been defeated in Iraq and Syria. The caliphate declared in 2014, which was once the size of Great Britain, is no more. Its de facto capitals, Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria, were captured after long and bloody sieges in the second half of 2017.

#### ISIS is no longer a thing

Emma Graham-Harrison 17, guardian reporter, “Iraq formally declares end to fight against Islamic State”, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/09/iraq-formally-declares-end-to-fight-against-islamic-state>

Iraq has formally declared its fight against Islamic State over after three years of heavy combat, although surviving militants are widely expected to launch a guerrilla war. Isis has been driven from all the territory it once held inside Iraq, the prime minister, Haider al-Abadi, announced in Baghdad on Saturday. At the peak of its military power, the extremist group controlled nearly a third of the country, including Mosul, Iraq’s second-largest city. The full length of the border between Iraq and Syria, which Isis fighters traversed freely for years, is also now held by Iraqi forces, a top military commander said. “All Iraqi lands are liberated from terrorist Daesh [Isis] gangs and our forces completely control the international Iraqi-Syrian border,” Lt Gen Abdul-Amir Rasheed Yar Allah said. The slow and extremely bloody battle against Isis began in the summer of 2014, soon after a few thousand of the group’s fighters stunned Iraq and the world by seizing Mosul. The Iraqi military fled the city, leaving their weapons and equipment to Isis, and the city’s riches to bolster its coffers. For three years it was a financial and political hub for the extremists’ self-declared caliphate. Iraqi forces pushed back against the group city by city, finally retaking Mosul this summer. Abadi had declared victory over Isis then, but battles continued in a string of smaller towns and through swaths of surrounding desert.

#### The entire advantage is incorrect—the US beat ISIS and is currently withdrawing from Iraq.

Tawfeeq 2/6/18 (Mohammed, "US will reduce troop levels in Iraq, Baghdad says," CNN, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/06/middleeast/american-troops-iraq-intl/index.html>, MSCOTT)

The number of US forces in Iraq will fall after the government in Baghdad declared victory over ISIS, an Iraqi government spokesman told CNN.

On Monday, the US-led coalition fighting ISIS announced a "shift in focus" in its military campaign in Iraq. This meant US troops would be "gradually reduced," Iraqi government spokesman Saad al-Hadithi told CNN.

Last December, Iraq's military declared that it had "fully liberated" all of Iraq of "ISIS terrorist gangs" and retaken full control of the Iraqi-Syrian border.

"Enabled by accelerated successes following the liberation of Mosul, the Coalition will shift its focus in Iraq from enabling combat operations to sustaining military gains against Daesh (ISIS)," read the US-led Operation Inherent Resolve's statement.

The Pentagon said in December there were around 5,200 American forces in Iraq. Their ongoing presence is politically sensitive for Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, who is facing national elections in March.

The coalition statement did not say where the forces would go, but the Trump administration announced last year that troop levels in Afghanistan would rise.

ISIS rapidly captured a large swath of territories in Iraq and Syria and declared an Islamic caliphate in 2014. At one pont, it held more than 34,000 square miles territory from the Mediterranean coast to south of Baghdad.

The campaign to eliminate ISIS's territorial foothold took nearly 25,000 coalition airstrikes in more than three years.

In 2003, an American-led invasion toppled Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and troops engaged in extended fighting across the country, battling an insurgency and later sectarian violence. At their peak, US troop levels in Iraq stood near 166,000.

### 1NC – Oil Wars !D

#### Oil wars are a myth

Emily Meierding 16, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, “Dismantling the Oil Wars Myth”, http://www.emilymeierding.net/Research\_files/Meierding%20Dismantling%20the%20Oil%20Wars%20Myth%20Security%20Studies.pdf

These findings indicate that oil wars, as conventionally conceived, do not exist. Oil is an extremely valuable natural resource. However, invasion, occupation, international, and investment costs reduce the payoffs of seizing foreign resources. Profiting from seized oil is difficult at best and impossible at worst. As a result, petroleum prizes are not sufficiently valuable for oil to be a significant contributor to leaders’ decisions for international war. Consequently, a territory’s petroleum endowments are a poor predictor of its ability to inspire interstate conflict. These observations have positive implications for contemporary disputes in oil-rich regions like the South China Sea, East China Sea, eastern Mediterranean, and Arctic, as they suggest that competition over these territories’ oil resources will not lead to intense militarized conflicts. However, one might counter this optimistic assessment by arguing that the contemporary contests are not analogous to the historical cases. The greatest difference between them is that, in the current disputes, political authority is ambiguous; multiple countries have legitimate claims to contested territories. Consequently, in these areas, an aggressor would not be seizing “foreign” oil. This distinction would reduce occupation costs, as local resistance would be more restrained.140 Invasion costs would also be lower, since most of the resources at stake in these contests are prospective; there is less oil infrastructure for aggressors and targets to destroy.141 These arguments have some merit. However, prospective resources also generate higher investment costs, as countries must explore for oil, instead of just producing it. The total payoffs that an aggressor can accrue from prospective resources are also very uncertain. In addition, international costs remain high, as the international community condemns the use of force in all territorial disagreements, including those where political authority is ambiguous. Hence, the costs of aggression should still deter contemporary adversaries from fighting for oil. This is not to say that current disputes in purportedly oil-rich regions will never escalate. However, if they do, it will be for other, more pressing reasons. The resultant conflicts will not be oil wars.

### 2NC – Oil Wars !D

#### Oil wars are incredibly rare and won’t escalate

Emily Meierding 16, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, “Do Countries Fight Over Oil?”, http://b-ok.xyz/book/2805301/b8f1b0

Most previous studies of international, oil-related conflicts have focused on extreme cases: so-called oil wars like World War II or Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. As a result, they have overestimated the risks posed by oil competi- tion. By adopting a more holistic approach, this chapter has demonstrated that major interstate conflicts, targeting oil fields, are exceptional. Most contests for control over oil resources are merely oil spats, which do not escalate into serious conflicts. Contemporary competitions in areas like the Arctic, Caspian Sea, East China Sea, Eastern Mediterranean, and South China Sea have thus far fallen into this category. Although oil-related con- frontations, like the 2014 Sino-Vietnamese rig incident or Turkey’s deploy ment of the Barbaros in 2014–15, occur periodically, leaders have prevented the incidents from intensifying. They are likely to maintain this restraint in the future. As the chapter’s historical analysis demonstrates, even rival states, with defense guarantees from foreign powers and hostile domestic populations, do not intensify oil spats. Regional petroleum competition is therefore not a serious threat to international security. Although claimant countries may eventually fight over other issues, such as control over sea lanes, regional hegemony, or national pride, oil competition will not be the trigger for these conflicts. Meanwhile, wars for survival, targeting oil resources, are currently improbable, both because of their historical rarity and because contemporary oil consumers and producers are unlikely to experience the three necessary con- ditions for launching major campaigns against foreign fields. Consumers like the US, China, and the European Union can rely on international trade to meet national import needs without compromising national energy security. Supply shutoffs, like the OPEC embargo in 1973–74, are unlikely, due to a lack of coordination among major producers. They are also unthreatening because of the oil market’s current diversity and flexibility. Moreover, even in 1975, in the aftermath of the first energy crisis, American authori- ties concluded that it was not worth the effort to seize Middle Eastern oil fields (Congressional Research Service 1975). Today’s consumers are even less inclined to do so. Producers will also refrain from using intense militarized force to increase national oil endowments. This restraint arises as much from a lack of capacity as from a lack of will. States like Algeria, Angola, Iraq, Nigeria, and Venezuela have strong incentives to increase national oil reserves and revenue, due to their intense dependence on oil rents and their small foreign exchange reserves, which make them highly vulnerable to oil price drops. However, they lack promising targets for international aggression. Angola and Nigeria’s neighbors are small producers, while Algeria has little to gain from seizing Libya’s disordered petroleum industry. Venezuela has a more appealing target in Colombia, but is weaker than its neighbor, so Caracas is unlikely to launch an attack. Iraq is also constrained, both by Iran’s military strength and by the certainty of a vigorous third-party response to another assault on Kuwait. Thus, today’s producers, as well as consumers, are unlikely aggressors. States may continue to spar for control over oil. However, they will not fight over it.

#### No impact to oil price rise

Emily Meierding 14, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, “Emily Meierding on Resource Wars”, http://www.css.ethz.ch/en/services/digital-library/articles/article.html/185206/pdf

I am going to say no. As oil prices rise, countries have an incentive to develop substitutes. Not all countries will be able to do that, at least not all countries will be able to keep pace with the development of substitutes and finding adequate alternative energy resources. But of course we already see that, when many developing countries can’t afford access to as much energy as they would prefer to have. The small developing countries often have difficulty in engaging in very intense militarized conflicts, so my guess is that more developed countries will still be able to gradually substitute for energy at a pace that enables them to avoid outright conflict. Again, that is depending on having a market that continues to function and having price signals prompt development of alternatives and substitutes. But warfare is really expensive and even though oil is an incredibly valuable commodity, fighting for it is not particularly efficient and countries have very strong incentives to avoid that. So unless there is a political reason for them to be fighting, I don’t see it as being likely. Maybe more competition but not more conflict.

### 1NC – No Troop Increase

#### US is reducing its presence in Iraq now

Mohammed Tawfeeq 18, CNN international correspondent, “US will reduce troop levels in Iraq, Baghdad says”, <https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/06/middleeast/american-troops-iraq-intl/index.html>

The number of US forces in Iraq will fall after the government in Baghdad declared victory over ISIS, an Iraqi government spokesman told CNN. On Monday, the US-led coalition fighting ISIS announced a "shift in focus" in its military campaign in Iraq. This meant US troops would be "gradually reduced," Iraqi government spokesman Saad al-Hadithi told CNN. Last December, Iraq's military declared that it had "fully liberated" all of Iraq of "ISIS terrorist gangs" and retaken full control of the Iraqi-Syrian border. "Enabled by accelerated successes following the liberation of Mosul, the Coalition will shift its focus in Iraq from enabling combat operations to sustaining military gains against Daesh (ISIS)," read the US-led Operation Inherent Resolve's statement.

### 2NC – No Troop Increase

#### US reducing presence in Iraq now

Rikar Hussein 18, VOA news reporter, “US-Led Coalition to Reduce Forces in Iraq”, <https://www.voanews.com/a/us-led-coalition-to-reduce-forces-in-iraq/4378785.html>

The U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State (IS) said Friday that a small number of its forces might leave Iraq following a decision to shut down its ground forces command headquarters, known as the Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command (CJFLCC). The coalition announced the shutdown of the headquarters on Monday during a ceremony in Baghdad. It said the decision marked the end of major combat operations in Iraq and Syria against IS and a change in the responsibilities of the coalition. “The efficiencies gained by headquarters consolidation will enable a slight reduction in personnel within the theater of operations,” U.S. Army Colonel Thomas Veale, a spokesman for the coalition, told VOA. Veale said the change would consolidate the coalition’s missions to advise and assist the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) under a single headquarters. “This reflects the coalition’s commitment to eliminate unnecessary command structures as the nature of its support to the ISF evolves from supporting and enabling combat operations to the training and development of self-sufficient Iraqi security-related capabilities,” he added. 5,000 U.S. troops in Iraq The exact number of coalition forces in Iraq is unknown, but the U.S. has said it currently has an estimated 5,000 forces in the country. Veale said that number “will gradually decrease over time as the ISF demonstrates increased capability and capacity.”

#### US troop presence in Iraq is getting cut down

Mohamed Mostafa 18, Iraqnews reporter, “Number of U.S. troops in Iraq will be cut down gradually: ambassador”, <https://www.iraqinews.com/iraq-war/number-u-s-troops-iraq-will-cut-gradually-ambassador/>

The U.S. military presence in Iraq is limited to advisory duties and the number of troops will be cut down gradually, American ambassador to Iraq said Wednesday. Alsumaria News quoted Douglas Silliman saying in a press conference at the embassy in Baghdad that U.S. military presence has been decreased in Iraq, especially in Anbar province in coordination with Iraqi forces. He noted that the next months will see U.S. troops reduced gradually without a replacement. According to Silliman, the U.S. is currently focused on the training of Iraqi troops to maintain control over areas recaptured from Islamic State militants, as well as humanitarian aid to refugees.

### 1NC – Price Spikes =/= Econ !

#### The economy is resilient – price shocks are irrelevant now

Jorg Decressin 12, IMF Research Department, “IMF Survey: Global Economy Learns to Absorb Oil Price Hikes”,

In new research, IMF economists attribute this resilience to five underlying factors: 1. Stronger demand The reason for the current price hikes differs from the past. Increases in the 1970s and 1980s were caused largely by sharp disruptions to world supply. In contrast, a prime reason for the increases since 2000 has been stronger-than-expected demand from emerging market economies. The strong growth of emerging markets has benefited both them and the global economy: raising living standards and increasing their demand for products made abroad. A side-effect of this may have been an increase in oil prices, but this has not derailed the benefits of increased growth. 2. Central bank policies Central banks and economies have become more adept at dealing with price shocks. In the 1970s and 1980s, oil price rises triggered fears of inflation, and workers would try to protect themselves by demanding higher nominal wage increases. This had the effect of setting off wage-price spirals. Now, greater awareness of the impact of high wage increases—including lost employment and reforms to labor markets—have led to more job-friendly wage setting. Central banks have become more adept at convincing workers that oil price increases will not feed through into inflation. Today, headline inflation temporarily increases after an oil price increase, but nominal wages hardly respond. Workers have grown to expect this rise in headline inflation, and anticipate that it will be temporary. Given the experience of the past, more recently many oil-importing economies with strong central banks have experienced little impact on core inflation and wage increases, despite oil price rises. This has allowed central banks to be more supportive of promoting recovery in the economy after an oil price increase, rather than having to raise interest rates to dampen inflationary expectations. 3. Recycling the benefits of oil profits The revenues from oil exports are flowing back to oil-importing economies. This helps bring down interest rates for households and firms, and so supports investment and growth in these economies. 4. Greater efficiency Oil price shocks do not have the same impact as in the past because economies have become more efficient in the use of energy. The amount of energy it takes to produce a dollar of income has been steadily declining for 40 years. This decline in energy intensity is expected to continue. Major emerging markets are also becoming more efficient in the use of energy, and they are expected to continue to make efficiency gains. By 2030, the major regions of the world—the United States, China, and India—are projected to have the same energy intensity. 5. Diversification Countries have increasingly diversified their energy sources over recent decades. They import energy from many more places than in the 1970s. They also use more varied forms of energy. This makes them less vulnerable to disruptions from any one supplier or source of energy. The United States, for example, buys crude oil and gasoline from more than 40 countries and jet fuel from more than 25 countries. Countries have also increased their use of natural gas, and are importing it from many more countries. Norway has continued to grow in importance as an exporter of natural gas, and several new producers have emerged, including Qatar, Turkmenistan, Nigeria, Egypt, and Australia. By 2030, it is expected that energy use will be even more diversified. Oil, coal, and gas are predicted to each have a 30 percent world market share, with hydro, nuclear and renewables accounting for the remaining 10 percent.

### 2NC – Price Spikes =/= Econ !

#### The US economy is resilient, price spikes wouldn’t cause a recession

Shushanik Papanyan 14, Assistant Professor in the Economics Department at the University of Texas, Arlington, “U.S. Economy’s Resilience to Oil Price Shocks”, https://www.bbvaresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/141126\_US\_EW\_MacroOilEffects.pdf

The post-great recession U.S. economy has displayed a decline in producer sensitivity to crude oil price while indicating a more sensitive consumer response. There is a qualitative change in the post-great recession oil shock effect, one in which the inflation trend became less interconnected with movements in the crude oil price. The rise of alternative energy sources and the decline of energy intensive production as a share of GDP could be likely contributors to the break of the traditional oil price-inflation relationship. At the same, this should also take some weight off the Federal Reserve’s shoulders and enable the FOMC to continue with its predetermined steps of monetary policy normalization. However, our initial analysis did not indicate an increased resilience of the U.S. economy to oil price shocks. In the case of a permanent shock to the oil price, we observed a sizable effect on the potential GDP growth, with a negative relationship between oil price change and GDP growth. This outcome is in line with previous economic literature findings that the negative oil price-GDP relationship holds even for the oil-exporting countries as well as for both developed and developing nations.

#### Increased domestic production means oil price shocks won’t collapse the economy

Steve Liesman 18, CNBC's senior economics reporter, “Rising oil prices, once a big negative, may now be 'a wash' for the US economy”, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/14/rising-oil-prices-may-now-be-a-positive-for-the-us-economy.html

In a significant shift in thinking, several economists contacted by CNBC now believe a rise in oil prices may not produce very much, if any, drag on U.S. growth. Some even contend that the nation's new oil-producing prowess make a rise in prices "a wash" for growth. This is a complete about-face for old metrics where it was practically automatic for economists to mark down growth when oil prices rose. But the rise of the United States to become the world's second-largest oil producer has changed the calculus for how rising energy prices affect the economy. Consumer pain at the pump is now seen as an offset to an extent by increases in capital spending by U.S. oil companies and by gains in the growing number of regions producing energy. And what once would have been a massive surge in the oil trade deficit, which would subtract from gross domestic product, is now offset to a large degree by U.S. oil exports. "We think the effect will round to a wash,'' said Michael Feroli, chief U.S. economist with J.P. Morgan Chase. "Our prior modeling would likely have produced a slightly more adverse impact, perhaps annualizing to a quarter point off growth for two consecutive quarters." Now, Feroli sees a roughly 0.2 percent decrease from lower consumer spending offset by a 0.2 percent gain in capital spending.

### 1NC – Russia !D

#### No US-Russia war– 7 reasons

**Peck 14** [[Michael Peck](http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/) (Contributor on defense and national security for Forbes); “7 Reasons Why America Will Never Go To War Over Ukraine”; 3/05/2014; http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2014/03/05/7-reasons-why-america-will-never-go-to-war-over-ukraine/]

America is the mightiest military power in the world. And that fact means absolutely nothing for the Ukraine crisis. Regardless of whether Russia continues to occupy the Crimea region of Ukraine, or decides to occupy all of Ukraine, the U.S. is not going to get into a shooting war with Russia. This has nothing to do with whether Obama is strong or weak. Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan would face the same constraints. The U.S. may threaten to impose economic sanctions, but here is why America will never smack Russia with a big stick: Russia is a nuclear superpower. Russia has an estimated 4,500 active nuclear warheads, according to the [Federation of American Scientists](http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html). Unlike North Korea or perhaps Iran, whose nuclear arsenals couldn’t inflict substantial damage, Russia could totally devastate the U.S. as well as the rest of the planet. U.S. missile defenses, assuming they even work, are not designed to stop a massive Russian strike. For the 46 years of the Cold War, America and Russia were deadly rivals. But they never fought. Their proxies fought: Koreans, Vietnamese, Central Americans, Israelis and Arabs. The one time that U.S. and Soviet forces almost went to war was during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Neither Obama nor Putin is crazy enough to want to repeat that. Russia has a powerful army. While the Russian military is a shadow of its Soviet glory days, it is still a formidable force. The Russian army has about 300,000 men and 2,500 tanks (with another 18,000 tanks in storage), according to the “[Military Balance 2014″](http://www.iiss.org/en/militarybalanceblog/blogsections/2014-3bea/january-1138/milbal-advertorial-dfa6)  from the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Its air force has almost 1,400 aircraft, and its navy 171 ships, including 25 in the Black Sea Fleet off Ukraine’s coast. U.S. forces are more capable than Russian forces, which did not perform impressively during the [2008 Russo-Georgia War](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Georgian_war). American troops would enjoy better training, communications, drones, sensors and possibly better weapons (though the latest Russian fighter jets, such as the T-50, could be trouble for U.S. pilots). However, better is not good enough. The Russian military is not composed of lightly armed insurgents like the Taliban, or a hapless army like the Iraqis in 2003. With advanced weapons like T-80 tanks, supersonic AT-15 Springer anti-tank missiles, BM-30 Smerch multiple rocket launchers and S-400 Growler anti-aircraft missiles, Russian forces pack enough firepower to inflict significant American losses. Ukraine is closer to Russia. The distance between Kiev and Moscow is 500 miles. The distance between Kiev and New York is 5,000 miles. It’s much easier for Russia to send troops and supplies by land than for the U.S. to send them by sea or air. The U.S. military is tired. After nearly 13 years of war, America’s armed forces need a breather. Equipment is worn out from long service in Iraq and Afghanistan, personnel are worn out from repeated deployments overseas, and there are still about 40,000 troops still fighting in Afghanistan. The U.S. doesn’t have many troops to send. The U.S. could easily dispatch air power to Ukraine if its NATO allies allow use of their airbases, and the aircraft carrier George H. W. Bush and its hundred aircraft are patrolling the Mediterranean. But for a ground war to liberate Crimea or defend Ukraine, there is just the 173rd Airborne Brigade in Italy, the 22nd Marine Expeditionary Unit sailing off Spain, the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment in Germany and the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. While the paratroopers could drop into the combat zone, the Marines would have sail past Russian defenses in the Black Sea, and the Stryker brigade would probably have to travel overland through Poland into Ukraine. Otherwise, bringing in mechanized combat brigades from the U.S. would be logistically difficult, and more important, could take months to organize. The American people are tired. Pity the poor politician who tries to sell the American public on yet another war, especially some complex conflict in a distant Eastern Europe nation. Neville Chamberlain’s words during the 1938 Czechoslovakia crisis come to mind: “How horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas-masks here because of a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we know nothing.” America‘s allies are tired. NATO sent troops to support the American campaign in Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. Britain sent troops to Iraq and Afghanistan, and has little to show for it. It is almost inconceivable to imagine the Western European public marching in the streets to demand the liberation of Crimea, especially considering the region’s sputtering economy, which might be snuffed out should Russia stop exporting natural gas. As for military capabilities, the Europeans couldn’t evict Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi without American help. And Germans fighting Russians again? Let’s not even go there.

### 2NC – Russia !D

#### No US Russia war

**Bandow 10** — senior fellow at the Cato Institute (Doug, “Give Peace a Chance”, The National Interest, 3/15/2010, http://www.cato.org/pub\_display.php?pub\_id=11573)

First, Moscow poses no threat to America. No doubt, Vladimir Putin's Russia has taken a nasty authoritarian turn. But it is a declining power with a weakened military and shrinking population. Washington once feared the well-provisioned Soviet military. Today Moscow is buying ships from France. Russia is not even to blame for the Georgian war. The Putin government may have provoked conflict with Georgia, but it did not force the Saakashvili government to fire the first shot. The war looks similar to President George H. W. Bush's invasion of Panama: a dubious venture, but one foolishly invited by an irresponsible local ruler. Even assuming blatant aggression, Georgia, a border state that was once part of Imperial Russia as well as the Soviet Union, is a matter of peculiar geopolitical interest in Moscow. The Baltic States are not such obvious targets of Russia's coercive attention. Moreover, the Russia-Georgia war basically exhausted Russian offensive capabilities. Moscow retains a superpower's nuclear arsenal, but little else. Today the Kremlin can barely rough up Tbilisi. Even Ukraine would not be easy for Moscow to swallow. The European Union has three times the population and ten times the GDP of Russia. The United States has an even greater advantage. Moscow isn't going to choose war with America. Why should Washington choose war with Russia?

#### Deterrence ensures no escalation—only 4% risk of war

Apps 15

Peter Apps. Executive Director of the Project for the Study of the 21st Century, Global Defense Correspondent for Reuters. "Is the risk of nuclear war rising?," Reuters. 12-20-2015. http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/12/20/whats-the-likelihood-of-nuclear-war-in-the-next-20-years

The risk of nuclear release involving Russia was seen at 4 percent, twice that of a U.S.-China exchange. Perhaps that shouldn’t be surprising. The United States and China, after all, are not just military powers, but major economic powers that ultimately both benefit from a globalized, successful world. Russia, on the other hand, really only has its military strength — and particularly its nuclear capability — to flex when it wishes to demonstrate superpower status. After a generation in which major European war was simply never thought possible, it’s worth remembering the continent is still home to more than half the world’s nuclear weapons. And yet, amid such apocalyptic talk, our survey shows that all of these conflicts remain on balance unlikely, often very unlikely. At one of our events earlier this year, Harvard geopolitics expert Professor Joseph Nye pointed out that nuclear weapons have so far acted to avert war by functioning as a brutally effective “crystal ball.” What their existence meant, he said, was that national leaders knew what the consequences of going over the edge would be — complete and utter destruction and a war which everyone would lose. Had the leaders of Europe experienced such clarity before World War One, he suggested, they could well have stepped back from the brink. And sure enough, it’s true that we have avoided such conflicts in the era of “mutually assured destruction.” The modern great power confrontations, though, lack some of the certainties of that era. In Cold War Europe, for example, it was always assumed that the outbreak of conventional war would inevitably and quickly go nuclear. That was one of the reasons it never started. Our results show a growing belief that some limited conventional conflict could be sustained without crossing the threshold. Our respondents may be right — but any period in which nuclear powers are fighting, even conventionally,

### 1NC – Water Wars !D

#### No risk of water wars---historical evidence all concludes neg---cooperation is way more likely and solves

Jeremy Allouche 11 is currently a Research Fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex. "The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade" Food PolicyVolume 36, Supplement 1, January 2011, Pages S3-S8 Accessed via: Science Direct Sciverse

Water/food resources, war and conflict

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.¶ Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations¶ In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.¶ In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.¶ The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.¶ None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).¶ As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 ([FAO, 1978] and [FAO, 1984]).¶ The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example [Allouche, 2005], [Allouche, 2007] and [Rouyer, 2000]). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians ([Dinar and Dinar, 2005] and [Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006]).¶ In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.¶ The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict ([Brauch, 2002] and [Pervis and Busby, 2004]). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ([Barnett and Adger, 2007] and [Kevane and Gray, 2008]).

### 2NC – Water Wars !D

#### No water wars

Conca 12 (Ken, professor at American University's School of International Service, where he directs the Global Environmental Politics Program, "Decoupling Water and Violent Conflict," Fall, Issues in Science & Technology, Vol. 29 Issue 1, Academic Search Premier)

The good news is that although countries may sometimes use bellicose rhetoric when discussing water supplies, there are no significant examples in the historical record of countries going to war over water. The most comprehensive study to date, which looked at water-related events in shared river basins during the second half of the 20th century, found that cooperative events, such as treaties, scientific exchanges, or verbal declarations of cooperation, outnumbered instances of conflict, such as verbal hostility, coercive diplomacy, or troop mobilization, by roughly two to one; and that even the most severe episodes of conflict stopped short of outright warfare. Moreover, when conflict episodes did occur, they were typically not the result of water scarcity. Rather, the key factor was the inability of governments to adapt to rapid changes, such as when part of a country split off to become a new one or when a decision to build a large dam was made without consulting downstream neighbors. The reasons for the lack of violent conflict are not surprising: War between nations is an increasingly rare event in world politics, water relations are embedded in broader relations between countries, and there are far less costly alternatives than war to improve water availability or efficiency of use. Well-designed cooperative agreements can go a long way toward managing shared rivers in a fair and peaceful manner.

#### Resource conflicts remain localized

Meierding 13 (Emily, Assistant Professor of International Relations and Political Science – Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, Ph.D. – University of Chicago, Fellow – Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, “Climate Change and Conﬂict: Avoiding Small Talk about the Weather”, International Studies Review, Vol. 0, pg. 1-19, 4-5, Wiley Online)

Recent Methodological Developments Early on in environmental conﬂict research, scholars recognized that, if environmental factors encouraged contention, many of these conﬂicts would occur at the substate level and entail a limited number of casualties. Renewable resource scarcity, in particular, was associated with inter-communal conﬂict: two groups contesting local resource access, with little or no state involvement. This speciﬁcation was not an obstacle for qualitative analyses of environmental conﬂict, such as those conducted by ENCOP and the Toronto Group. However, it has been a signiﬁcant impediment to quantitative environmental conﬂict and climate change–conﬂict research, due to limitations in data availability. Quantitative environmental conﬂict research emerged from civil war studies. The data sets initially employed in these analyses only recognized conﬂicts as civil wars once they resulted in one thousand battle deaths: an extremely high threshold for environmentally induced contention. The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conﬂict Dataset reduced the fatality threshold to twenty-ﬁve (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, and Strand 2002). However, it maintained the requirement that the central government be a participant in each conﬂict. It is only in the last few years that researchers have begun to employ data on substate or nonstate conﬂicts—those that do not involve government actors—and on conﬂicts and other forms of political mobilization that generate fewer than twenty-ﬁve deaths. These new data sets, such as the Social Conﬂict in Africa Database (Salehyan, Hendrix, Hamner, Case, Linebarger, Stull, and Williams 2012) and the UCDP Non-State Conﬂict Dataset (Sundberg, Eck, and Kreutz 2012), as well as country-speciﬁc conﬂict data collection efforts (such as those employed by Meier et al. 2007; Raleigh 2010; Slettebak and Theisen 2011; Theisen et al. 2011/12; Raleigh and Kniveton 2012), offer a promising avenue for future quantitative analyses of climate change–conﬂict linkages, as they will enable researchers to focus on the forms of contention that are most likely to be linked to environmental change.6

### 1NC – ISF Fails

#### ISF inevitably fails – assumes US training

Reuters 16, “IRAQI ARMY STILL INEFFECTIVE DESPITE U.S. TRAINING”, http://www.newsweek.com/iraqi-army-ineffective-despite-us-training-466410

A 17-month U.S. effort to retrain and reunify Iraq's regular army has failed to create a large number of effective Iraqi combat units or limit the power of sectarian militias, according to current and former U.S. military and civilian officials. Concern about the shortcomings of the American attempt to strengthen the Iraqi military comes as Iraqi government forces and Shi’ite militias have launched an offensive to retake the city of Falluja from the Islamic State militant group (ISIS). Aid groups fear the campaign could spark a humanitarian catastrophe, as an estimated 50,000 Sunni civilians remain trapped in the besieged town. The continued weakness of regular Iraqi army units and reliance on Shi’ite militias, current and former U.S. military officials said, could impede Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s broader effort to defeat ISIS and win the long-term support of Iraqi Sunnis. The sectarian divide between the majority Shi'ite and minority Sunni communities threatens to split the country for good. Critics agree that there have been some military successes, citing the continued victories of American-trained Iraqi Special Forces, who have been fighting ISIS for two years. But the presence of 4,000 American troops has failed to change the underlying Iraqi political dynamics that fuel the rise and growing power of sectarian militias. Retired U.S. Lieutenant General Mick Bednarek, who commanded the U.S. military training effort in Iraq from 2013 to 2015, said the Iraqi army has not improved dramatically in the past eight months. He blamed a variety of problems, from a lack of Iraqis wanting to join the military to the resistance of some lower-level Iraqi officers to sending units to American training. “The Iraqi military’s capacity hasn’t improved that much—part of that is the continuing challenge of recruitment and retention,” said Bednarek. “Our (officers) train who shows up, and the issue is we are not sure who is going to show up.”

### 2NC – ISF Fails

#### ISF can’t deter ISIS or maintain stability

Zack Beauchamp 14, senior reporter at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, and a host of Worldly, Vox's podcast on covering foreign policy, He has an MSc from the London School of Economics in International Relations, “Why the Iraqi army can't defeat ISIS”, https://www.vox.com/2014/6/20/5824480/why-the-iraqi-army-cant-defeat-isis

In Mosul, Iraq's second most populous city, about 800 ISIS fighters invaded and sent 30,000 Iraqi army troops running. That's been portrayed as a sudden collapse of the Iraqi army, but that's not quite right. "The Iraqi army has been collapsing for months now," Yasser Abbas told me. Abbas, originally from Baghdad, is an analyst at the private research and consulting firm Caerus Associates. Before that, he served as a linguist in for the military in Iraq from 2005 to 2009. "At the end of 2006, I was involved in training the Iraqi national police in Baghdad," he said. "The amount of corruption and under-training was [astounding] ... insubordination became widespread." So, for Abbas, the military's collapse "didn't happen at once. It's been happening for a very long time." For instance, the governor of Mosul ordered the military units in the area to go to a particular town, and "the battalion commander said no, it was too dangerous." It's the same insubordination problem the army has had for years. And even when they do fight, many units aren't all that effective. "They'll stand up with a PKM [machine gun] and blast off 250 rounds" says Phillip Smyth, a researcher at the University of Maryland. "What is that doing?"

#### ISF fails – corruption and lack of a strong chain of command

DW 14, Deutsche Welle, Germany's public international broadcaster, “Weak Iraqi army no match for ISIS insurgents”, https://www.dw.com/en/weak-iraqi-army-no-match-for-isis-insurgents/a-17707525

Despite its manpower and sizeable weaponry stocks, the Iraqi army is hardly powerful. According to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, the command structure is a key weakness.It's tailored to Maliki, who currently serves as the defense and interior ministers, as well as the commander in chief of the army. "Prime Minister al-Maliki has continuously worked to strengthen his control over the Iraqi army and security forces," the authors of the CSIS report wrote. They said Maliki is using the state's security apparatus for political control and repression. Meyer said the officers' ranks are also often awarded to government cronies and have little to with military competence. Another problem is the country's sectarian divide. Many Sunnis feel oppressed by the Shiite majority. The ISIS militants, on the other hand, present themselves as protectors of the Sunni minority against the Shiite-dominated government and its security forces. If ISIS insurgents attack army posts in Sunni neighborhoods, Sunni soldiers leave their positions, take their weapons, and join the extremists. Meyer said the ISIS militants deliberately spread reports of government soldiers being slaughtered by the Islamist group to undermine morale. However, the Mainz-based researcher added that when Sunni extremists attempt to advance through Shiite areas, they also meet with fierce opposition from Shiite militias. These groups have risen up to take the place of the failed army, to prevent the ISIS from conquering Shiite neighborhoods and destroying Shiite shrines. Low morale, low pay Widespread corruption is another reason the Iraqi army is so weak. The CSIS report revealed that even when US advisors were in the country, many soldiers sold military equipment in an attempt to supplement their meager salaries. In order to stop ISIS' rapid advance, Maliki has turned to the United States for help. Washington has been providing weapons to support the Iraqi army against the militia since the beginning of 2014. "Now the demand will be that the Americans proceed with air strikes and drones against the ISIS forces," said Meyer. US President Barack Obama has stressed that options to help the government in Baghdad remain open. According to Meyer though, the government in Washington believes Maliki is the main offender and has brought the situation on himself. He said the deliberate discrimination of the Sunni minority is a main cause of the current conflict.

### 1NC – NGOs Fail

#### NGO aid is *useless* – it’s *underfunded*, *funds are misused*, *unequally distributed*, and it gives a *false sense of security* all while fueling political and cultural conflicts

Amelia Branczik 04, joined Crisis Group in June 2008 and manages the Brussels-based research unit, supporting Crisis Group’s field research and advocacy on policy and thematic issues and producing the monthly CrisisWatch bulletin. Before joining Crisis Group, Amelia spent three years at the World Bank, where she worked on agriculture and rural development projects in the Western Balkans and co-authored books on rural development in the Western Balkans and the distributional impact of power sector reforms in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. Prior to the World Bank she spent two years at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington DC, working on conflict prevention issues at CFR’s Center for Preventive Action and researching a book about the World Bank. She has also spent time working in Indonesia, Bosnia and Montenegro. Amelia has a Masters degree in international relations from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), specializing in Conflict Management and Economics, and a Bachelors degree in modern history from Oxford University, intense dabberoni, february, “Humanitarian Aid and Development Assistance”, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/humanitarian\_aid

Problems with Humanitarian Aid 1. Efficiency and Effectiveness An effective and timely humanitarian relief operation has the capacity to save thousands of lives. It is also, however, an extremely difficult undertaking. Potential beneficiaries may be located within a zone of conflict or in areas with poor infrastructure, making it difficult and dangerous for humanitarian agencies to deliver assistance. As a result, help may reach only the most accessible areas, with other potential beneficiaries being neglected. The ever-increasing number of agencies on the ground, the difficulty of obtaining accurate intelligence, and the unpredictability of humanitarian crises make effective management and coordination extremely difficult. Solving this problem requires improved intelligence gathering and sharing, as well as tight management and coordination. 2. Political Dilemmas "Sadako Ogata, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, crystallized the dilemma of the humanitarian alibi and of the United Nations, when it is held responsible for solving humanitarian crises such as that in Rwanda: 'No international humanitarian organization or NGO can solve political conflicts. We need political will, the involvement of government and their leaders, of the U.N. and regional organizations, to maintain and build peace.'" -- William Shawcross The 'humanitarian alibi' has been defined as "the misuse of the humanitarian idea and humanitarian workers by governments eager to do as little as possible in economically unpromising regions like sub-Saharan Africa."[2] Humanitarian aid gives the appearance that the international community is at least doing something, but "humanitarian intervention in the absence of a political solution solves nothing."[3] In the case of Sudan, relief efforts have been called "an excuse to do nothing," a result of the fact that the West has "no great interest" in political intervention to end the fighting.[4] Humanitarian aid that ensures that non-combatants are fed, sheltered, and healthy, but does not alleviate the violence around them, can lead to the "specter of the well-fed dead." Even more disturbing, the provision of humanitarian assistance can give non-combatants a mistaken sense of security and protection by the international community, with tragic consequences. Humanitarian aid can prolong and fuel conflicts, undermining its ultimate goal of saving lives: For fighting parties, aid can become a resource to be fought over. Aid leakage, or 'political taxation' of aid, refers to situations in which a portion of the aid goes directly to the fighting parties, who then use it themselves or sell it to buy weapons. Aid is fungible; because populations and troops are being fed by aid, fighting parties no longer have to worry about providing for this need themselves and are thus able to put more resources into fighting. Aid that helps only one side in a conflict can fuel tensions and competition between the sides. Simply ensuring equal distribution to different ethnic groups can reinforce divisions and 'labels' and make the groups less dependent on each other. A commonly cited example of aid perpetuating a conflict is that of Sudan, where civil war has lasted for well over a decade, and over two billion dollars have been spent on humanitarian aid. Both rebel leaders and aid workers openly acknowledge that humanitarian aid, in addition to saving many lives, is a large factor in making it possible for the belligerent groups to continue fighting. Aid can create private incentives for continuation of the war, for example by paying relatively high wages to local people employed by aid agencies. Imported food aid can undermine the local economy and make an activity like agriculture less profitable. Solving these problems through aid conditionality carries the risk of harming the poorest and most vulnerable members of society. 'Smart aid' responds to this dilemma by applying the principle of conditionality to aid that is of greatest benefit to warlords and political leaders. Incursions on national sovereignty: Governments may refuse to allow humanitarian agencies to assist their citizens and may object to conditionality of aid and development assistance, citing defense of their national sovereignty. However, there is a growing acceptance of the changing norm of sovereignty to "sovereignty as responsibility," which implies a government's responsibility for the well being of its citizens. 3. Criticisms of Humanitarian Organizations In Cambodia, UNTAC's 1991-93 20,000-person, multi-billion-dollar mission brought high inflation, social dislocation, and a large increase in prostitution and HIV/AIDS cases in Phnom Penh. In Afghanistan, Kabul rents have increased fivefold since the fall of the Taliban. The prices of staples such as rice have doubled, or even tripled, while most salaries have remained the same. There is little accountability in the humanitarian and development industry. There are no barriers to becoming an NGO and no comprehensive or enforceable performance standards for NGOs. Codes of conduct have been developed, such as the Red Cross Code of Conduct (1994), but compliance is voluntary. Because of the high staff turnover in humanitarian organizations and the different nature of conflicts in different countries, it is hard to build institutional memory to improve the efficiency of aid operations and to implement lessons learned. Competition for 'humanitarian market share.' The need to maintain a high profile in order to secure funding can influence NGOs' decision making, they cannot afford not to be seen at a disaster. This situation is aggravated by the impact of uneven media coverage of disasters. The dilemma of neutrality: The 1994 Code of Conduct of the International Federation of the Red Cross explicitly states that NGOs' work must be neutral. However, it is rare for the effects of aid to be neutral even if the provision of it is neutral. Furthermore, it is frustrating to give humanitarian aid to people without being able to protect their human rights. In working with the military, humanitarian agencies, especially NGOs, risk losing the neutrality that gives them their advantage. In addition, being associated with one side can endanger the work and the staff of NGOs. An influx of aid and aid workers can create huge interferences in the local economy. Services such as restaurants, hotels, and brothels tend to spring up as soon as a humanitarian or development operation begins. Houses are built in anticipation of the high rents that foreign aid agencies will pay and prices for commodities and rents inflate. Lifestyle and budgeting issues: A lot of the money for aid programs, particularly with international organizations like the United Nations, goes toward staff salaries and technical requirements, rather than to the intended recipients of aid. This can create tensions in relief programs. However, as aid workers often risk their lives in extremely difficult and stressful conditions, this is a difficult issue to resolve. Of two billion dollars spent on the UNTAC mission in Cambodia, most was spent on U.N. staff salaries (an estimated 118.5 million dollars) and travel costs (62 million dollars). Almost 9,000 new vehicles were purchased at a cost of approximately 81 million dollars, and all senior U.N. bureaucrats were given a daily hardship allowance of 145 dollars to supplement their salaries. At the time, the average annual income in Cambodia was 130 dollars. Problems with Development Assistance Many of the challenges listed above for humanitarian aid apply equally to development assistance. There are also issues that apply exclusively to development assistance. 1. Development assistance is not designed to prevent conflict Development assistance can promote conflict when it is administered without considering social and political conditions. It is very difficult to ensure that the effects of 'apolitical' aid are politically or ethnically neutral. Problems arise primarily due to the institutional cultures and organizational dynamics of donor agencies, which are not geared to dealing with the needs of deeply divided societies. Success is often measured in terms of the amount of money disbursed, rather than the outcome of programs. The mandate of these donor agencies is to promote economic growth and development "without regard to political or other non-economic influences or considerations."[5] Policies are aimed at improving overall macroeconomic stability and economic growth, irrespective of potential income-distribution effects. However, as James Boyce writes, to concentrate solely on increasing the size of the economic pie, without considering how that pie is divided, is an approach "singularly ill-suited to war-torn societies."[6] As all peace settlements are based on a balance of power between warring sides, any measure that disproportionately benefits or hurts one side can make both sides reassess their positions, with potentially catastrophic consequences for the peace. The policies of these lending agencies are based on neoclassical economic ideology and fail to take into account the needs of deeply divided and politically unstable societies. Policies such as liberalization of trade may cause short-term hardships such as increased unemployment, and through their uneven distributive effects can exacerbate cleavages between groups. Cutting government services to reduce budget deficits can weaken the social contract and the ties between citizens and government. Aid administered through government will favor those in power, while channeling aid in a way that bypasses central government can decrease a government's leverage, also causing problems. Lending agencies are gradually reforming to take into account lessons learned, and are forming conflict-prevention and post-conflict reconstruction units, as with the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit at the World Bank. Increasingly, agencies take into account the potential for conflict when designing their programs and adjust the programs accordingly. There are calls for projects to undergo conflict or ethno-national impact assessments (i.e., analyses of the affect of a proposed action on different ethnic or national groups and/or the conflict itself), in addition to the usual cost-benefit analysis. Another important measure is to involve these agencies more closely in the peace negotiations, as a means of bridging the gap between peace building and economic reconstruction and of improving overall coordination of post-conflict development. Bilateral development assistance also carries problems. Donor governments inevitably have competing multiple interests, only one of which is peace building. During the Cold War, geopolitical concerns were paramount. Economic and commercial interests are at stake, with roughly half of all bilateral aid tied to imports of goods and services from the donor country. Inadequate funding mechanisms: Most donors award funding on a year-by-year basis, making forward planning very difficult for agencies. In general, each year's funding has to be used up before the next year's funding can be obtained, even if that money could be more usefully spent at a later date. In general, the international community tends to take a fairly short-term view of post-conflict reconstruction, although in reality it takes years for reconciliation or refugee returns to occur. 2. Aid Conditionality Although conditionality can be very effective, those enforcing it may face significant difficulties. Donors must coordinate so that they don't undermine each other. Alternative sources of revenue that might weaken donors' leverage, such as recipients' access to natural resources, must be cut off. The potential cost to more vulnerable members of society must be alleviated if necessary, through the use of 'smart sanctions' with humanitarian exemptions. Careful use of carrots and sticks can involve slicing the carrot -- providing aid in installments, to maintain leverage. 3. Efficiency and Effectiveness of Development Assistance Development assistance may interfere with local capacities to deal with problems. This can make recipient countries dependent on aid, and encourage development techniques that are unsustainable when foreign aid dries up. In addition, the most educated and capable members of the local population are often employed by foreign agencies, where they are paid high salaries to work as drivers, translators, or administrative staff. As well as wasting valuable human capital and expertise, hiring these skilled people for relatively low-level jobs detracts from local initiatives to govern and develop. If local NGOs are encouraged to undertake development programs, they are often provided with monetary grants, encouraging more costly initiatives than are unsustainable in the long run. Often, NGOs will focus their resources on winning such grants, rather than helping the local communities. In addition, instead of working together to increase their effectiveness, they will be locked in competition against one another. What civil society initiatives really need is less expensive, long-term commitment.

### 2NC – NGOs Fail

#### NGOs fail in the Middle East

PATRICK COCKBURN 14, is the author of Muqtada: Muqtada Al-Sadr, the Shia Revival, and the Struggle for Iraq, “How NGOs Failed Afghanistan”, https://www.counterpunch.org/2014/03/25/how-ngos-failed-afghanistan/

I thought bitterly of the torrent of aid that had flowed into Afghanistan since 2001 – the latest figures give US non-military aid alone as $100bn (£61bn) – which had done so little good to Mr Qudus and millions of other Afghans. Some 60 per cent of Afghan children are stunted due to malnourishment and only 27 per cent have access to safe drinking water. “Things may look all right to foreigners but in fact people are dying of starvation in Kabul,” Mr Qudus told me. The maladministration and wastefulness of the international aid effort in Afghanistan since 2001 are a staple of journalistic commentary, to some extent rightly. But the average lifespan of Afghans has risen from 45 years in 2001 to 62 today, an improvement due largely to a sharp drop in child mortality. In 2001, one in four Afghan children died before the age of five compared with one in 10 today. The reason for this dramatic progress is improved public health with better vaccination, midwifery and access to health care. Key to this development is $100m from USAID, so often the target of critics, without which the child mortality rate might have stayed where it was. “International aid” brings out the best and worst in people and institutions. It may be the occasion for appalling corruption and wastefulness or it can make the difference – as in the case of Afghan public health – between life and death for millions. There are aid workers who live a colonial lifestyle and never leave their offices, and others who show extraordinary skills and endurance. In the mid-1990s I came across a hospital in Iraqi Kurdistan, then sealed off from the outside world, which was supplying and fitting artificial limbs to people who had stepped on one of the millions of mines that littered the landscape. Villagers had been trying to make a little money to buy food by defusing mines and selling the explosives and the tin foil in which they were wrapped. Without the NGO-run hospital, few of these legless people would have survived. Likewise in 2001, life in the rebel-held Panjshir Valley was of medieval harshness, but at the bottom of the valley was a state-of-the-art Italian hospital. The picture is very varied. Wartime is not a good moment to start big long-term infrastructure projects. Insurgents know these are politically inspired and intended as a signal that the Afghan or Iraqi governments are doing something for their people. Naturally, they will try to sabotage such projects with mines, assassinations and general intimidation. An outstanding example of this in Afghanistan is the Kajaki hydroelectric dam on the Helmand River, originally completed by USAID as long ago as 1953, but needing a third turbine, ultimately brought in by British troops but never installed. The dam project is today the subject of an angry dispute between USAID, which is funding it, and the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, John Sopko, who says it has become too expensive to be worthwhile. He says that in 2001 the scheme was expected to cost just $17m but this has since risen to $345m. These figures are vehemently contested by USAID. As Iraq and Afghanistan are two of the most crooked and dysfunctional states in the world, it is unlikely that international aid, along with everything else, will be untainted by corruption and incompetence. It does not have to be like this. Critics of non-governmental organisations and international aid in general will be glad to learn that there is one place in the world where the NGOs have been expelled and local people are running their own project. But the anti-aid lobby may be taken aback by the identity of those running the anti-NGO campaign. They are, in fact, al-Shabaab, the local affiliate of al-Qa’ida in Somalia, who control the Lower Shabelle province, now once again the bread basket of the country. Al-Shabaab has put $2m of its funds into a canal-building project that has brought prosperity to local farmers who no longer depend on the uncertain rains. “We want our people to be free of NGOs and foreign hands. We want them to depend on each other and to stand free of outsiders,” Sheikh Abu Abdullah, the al-Shabaab governor of Lower Shabelle told al-Jazeera. Mohammed Sheikh Abdi, the head of a local farmers’ union, attributes the new prosperity to the NGO ban. “They bought their food from abroad and never bought from us local farmers,” he says. “They killed every incentive to farm. We were hostages to the NGOs.” Perhaps the lesson to be drawn from this is that the projects which succeed are modest in scale, easily monitored, produce immediate benefits and where all know that corruption will be inevitably punished.

### 1NC – Squo Solves Water

#### Squo solves the water crisis—Turkey won’t close the Tigris.

Karadeniz 6/7/18 (Tulay, "Turkey halts filling Tigris dam after Iraq complains of water...," U.S., <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-turkey/turkey-halts-filling-tigris-dam-after-iraq-complains-of-water-shortages-idUSKCN1J320X,> MSCOTT)

ANKARA/BAGHDAD (Reuters) - Turkey has temporarily stopped filling a huge dam on the Tigris River after complaints from neighboring Iraq, which is suffering water shortages, officials said on Thursday.

## Leadership Advantage

### Note

### 1NC – ME Irrelevant

#### The ME is irrelevant for broader US leadership

Emma Ashford 18, research fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, DC. She holds a PhD in politics from the University of Virginia and an MA from American University’s School of International Service, “Unbalanced: Rethinking America’s Commitment to the Middle East”, http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12\_Issue-1/Ashford.pdf

This article explores the strategic context and challenges facing the United States in the Middle East and argues for a return to a strategy of offshore balancing. It argues that two of America’s most important Cold War–era interests in the region—anticommunism and energy security— have been rendered largely irrelevant by geopolitical and technological changes. Meanwhile, large-scale military force has consistently proven ineffectual at tackling modern interests like counterterrorism. As the regional strategic environment shifts, today’s comprehensive approach to the region also carries increasing risks: it enables dangerous behaviors by US allies, engenders moral hazard in local nondemocratic states, and ignores the regional interests of other great powers like China.

### 2NC – ME Irrelevant

#### ME is irrelevant for US leadership – energy security isn’t tied to regional stability which answers their ONLY warrant

Emma Ashford 18, research fellow in defense and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute in Washington, DC. She holds a PhD in politics from the University of Virginia and an MA from American University’s School of International Service, “Unbalanced: Rethinking America’s Commitment to the Middle East”, http://www.airuniversity.af.mil/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-12\_Issue-1/Ashford.pdf

Many Americans now assume growing domestic shale production has reduced American reliance on Middle Eastern oil and gas.21 This is an oversimplification. Fracking has certainly helped to diversify sup- ply and reduce vulnerability, but it cannot insulate us entirely from oil price shocks.22 In effect, though only around 15 percent of American oil imports come from the Persian Gulf, the status of oil as a globally traded commodity means that supply shortages can create price shocks for everyone, potentially harming the global economy, including the economies of the United States and its allies.23 Yet even this is not as problematic as typically asserted. Global oil markets adapt well to oil shocks, typically replacing lost supply within three to six months while the infrastructure innovations put in place after the oil shocks of the 1970s, such as the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, mitigate and minimize economic damage during the adjustment period.24 Today, only a few scenarios have the potential to actually undermine American energy security: conquest of Middle Eastern oil fields by one country, the closure of key transit routes, or a civil war inside the world’s largest oil-producing state, Saudi Arabia. The first of these is extremely improbable, particularly given the conventional military weakness of most regional states. The second and third scenarios are also unlikely, but more to the point, neither could be prevented easily by large-scale US military presence. In the case of transit routes, analysts generally agree that while Iran possesses the capacity to impede shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, a small residual force would be sufficient to prevent this.25 In the case of Saudi civil strife, substantial US military presence is more likely to incite domestic unrest among the Kingdom’s religious conservatives than it is to prevent it. History also suggests that substan- tial US forces in the region are largely independent of energy security; the energy shocks of the 1970s were politically motivated, and even during the so-called tanker war the oil supply remained relatively secure throughout the light force posture period of the 1980s.26

## CP – NGOs – get from Counterplans.docx file